Louisiana Law Review
Volume 78
Number 4 Spring 2018

Article 11

5-30-2018

Good Faith in Louisiana Property Law
John A. Lovett

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev
Part of the Law Commons

Repository Citation
John A. Lovett, Good Faith in Louisiana Property Law, 78 La. L. Rev. (2018)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol78/iss4/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

Good Faith in Louisiana Property Law
Dedicated to A.N. Yiannopoulos
John A. Lovett**
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ................................................................................ 1163
I.

Encroaching Buildings: Article 670 ........................................... 1172

II.

Good Faith Purchaser Doctrine .................................................. 1179
A. Lost or Stolen Things........................................................... 1182
B. Annullable Title ................................................................... 1187
C. The Double Sale .................................................................. 1189
D. The Faithless Pledgee, Lessee, or Depositary...................... 1193

III. Accession ................................................................................... 1200
IV. Acquisitive Prescription with Respect to Immovables ............... 1210
Conclusion: Property Law Without Good Faith......................... 1218
INTRODUCTION
The concept of good faith is a cornerstone of Louisiana private law. It
plays a central role in the law of general and conventional obligations.1 It
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makes crucial appearances in the law of sales.2 It even affects subjects in
the law of persons, such as the civil effects of absolutely null and putative
marriages.3
But good faith is also a pivotal concept in Louisiana property law.
Although it has always been a feature of that law, during an intense burst
of law reform activity stretching from 1977 to 1982, the Louisiana
Legislature (“Legislature”) updated and extended the concept of good faith
in several core areas of property law.4

1. In the context of general and conventional obligations, all obligors and
obligees must conduct themselves in accordance with the general duty of good faith.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1759, 1770, 1983 (2018). An obligor in good faith who
breaches a conventional obligation is liable only for foreseeable damages, but an
obligor in bad faith can be liable for unforeseeable damages as long as those
damages directly resulted from his failure to perform. Id. arts. 1996–97. Other
provisions that employ good faith in the law of obligations include Louisiana Civil
Code article 1975 (“[O]utput or requirements must be measured in good faith.”);
article 2021 (“Dissolution of a contract does not impair the rights acquired through
an onerous contract by a third party in good faith.”); article 2028 (“Counterletters
can have no effects against third persons in good faith.”); and article 2035 (“Nullity
of a contract does not impair the rights acquired through an onerous contract by a
third party in good faith.”). For a detailed meditation on the role of good faith in the
law of obligations, see Saul Litvinoff, Good Faith, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1645 (1997).
2. Although the Louisiana Civil Code provisions in the chapter on sales do
not specifically use the term “good faith” in the text of the articles, revision
comments repeatedly distinguish between good faith and bad faith sellers. See, e.g.,
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2534 cmt. a (noting that the article “changes the law . . . by
extending the prescriptive period for actions in redhibition against a seller in good
faith from one to four years . . . .”) (emphasis added); id. art. 2545 cmt. b (describing
a manufacturer as being “deemed to be in bad faith” regardless of his actual
knowledge of the thing sold); art. 2545 cmt. f (noting that a buyer is not required to
give “a bad faith seller or a manufacturer” an opportunity to repair before instituting
an action in redhibition); art. 2545 cmt. g (referring to a potential credit a “bad faith
seller” can claim for use of thing in an action of redhibition).
3. Id. art. 96.
4. Through his leadership role with the Louisiana State Law Institute in the
revision of the Louisiana Civil Code and as the most widely cited and influential
commentator on Louisiana law, Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos significantly
influenced the development of good faith in Louisiana property law. See generally
Justice Harry T. Lemmon, A Tribute to Athanasios N. Yiannopoulos, 73 TUL. L.
REV. 1025 (1997); Tyler G. Storms, Interview with Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos:
Louisiana’s Most Influential Jurist in Our Time, 64 LA. BAR. J., June–July 2016,
at 24, 27 n.6 (listing the numerous Law Institute Committees for which Professor
Yiannopoulos served as reporter). It is fitting, then, that this Article contributes to
the current issue of the Louisiana Law Review published in his honor.
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This Article addresses the role of good faith in four of those distinct
areas: (1) as a prerequisite to the establishment of a predial servitude
benefiting the owner of a building that encroaches on the property of a
neighbor;5 (2) as a mediating device allocating the rights of an original
owner of a corporeal movable and a subsequent acquirer under the bona fide
purchaser doctrine;6 (3) as a defining characteristic establishing rights and
obligations under the law of accession when a person possesses immovable
property without a valid title;7 and (4) as a prerequisite for the acquisition of
ownership of, or other real rights in, immovable property by ten-year
acquisitive prescription.8 Although this Article notes the sources of good
faith in Louisiana jurisprudence, prior Louisiana civil codes, and European
civil codes considered in the revision process, it focuses primarily on how
good faith has functioned in the post-revision property law landscape. It
does so by examining the text and structure of the good faith provisions in
the continuous revised Civil Code and reported judicial decisions that have
employed the new or reformulated definitions of good faith.
Within the parameters of property law that are the focus of this Article,9
an owner of a corporeal thing experiences a loss of property rights in some
form or another. In the case of encroaching buildings, the servient estate
owner may be forced to relinquish a predial servitude over his immovable
property if the encroaching building owner is in good faith.10 In the case of
a lost or stolen corporeal movable, the owner must compensate a subsequent
acquirer before the owner can recover possession if the acquirer purchased

5. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 670.
6. Id. arts. 518–25.
7. Id. art. 487.
8. Id. arts. 3475, 3480–82. The Louisiana Civil Code also provides that a
possessor can acquire ownership of or other real rights in a movable through
acquisitive prescription after three years of possession with good faith and an act
sufficient to transfer ownership, but she must possess for ten years in the absence of
good faith or title to acquire ownership by prescription. Id. arts. 3489–91. Cases
applying these articles are discussed briefly infra note 276 and accompanying text.
9. Good faith also plays a quiet but significant role in the shadows of
Louisiana’s public records doctrine. See, e.g., Longleaf Invs., L.L.C. v. Tolintino,
108 So. 3d 157, 159–61 (La. App. Cir. 2012) (holding that a party who would
otherwise be a third party purchaser under Article 3338 of the Civil Code cannot
rely on the public records doctrine when there are indications of bad faith and
fraud). Consideration of good faith in the public records doctrine, however, is
beyond the scope of this Article. For more on this topic, see generally Michael
Palestina, Comment, Of Registry: Louisiana’s Revised Public Records Doctrine,
53 LOY. L. REV. 899 (2007).
10. Art. 670.
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the corporeal movable in good faith.11 In other situations covered by the
bona fide purchaser doctrine, the original owner of a corporeal movable
thing will lose all of his property rights in a corporeal movable he once
owned and cannot revendicate the thing if the acquirer takes possession in
good faith from a particular kind of intermediary.12 In accession, the owner
of immovable property must sometimes compensate another person who
enters his immovable without permission and improves it, derives natural
or civil fruits from it, or even depletes it of some of its actual substance, if
that other person is a good faith possessor.13 Finally, under the law of
acquisitive prescription, the original owner of an immovable will lose all
or a portion of her property rights to another person who has intruded on
the owner’s sphere of exclusive control if the intruder took possession
pursuant to a just title and was in good faith at the time of the intrusion.14
In all four of these situations, the Louisiana Civil Code shifts a property
law entitlement from the original owner to someone who ordinarily would not
be entitled to any legal protection.15 In each of these instances, the concept of
good faith serves as a crucial mediating device, reallocating the rights and
obligations of the original owner and the new player who has arrived on the
scene either uninvited or through some intermediate transaction.
This Article suggests that the concept of good faith has two components
in the context of property law.16 One component concerns honesty. A person

11. See id. arts. 523–24, discussed infra Part II.A.
12. This is true in cases involving annullable title, double dealers, and faithless
trustees. See id. arts. 518, 520 (repealed), 522, 525, discussed infra Parts III.B–D.
13. See id. arts. 483–89, 496–97, 527–29, discussed infra Part IV.
14. This is the case with encroaching building servitudes, art. 670, discussed
infra Part II, and ten-year acquisitive prescription of immovables. Id. arts. 3475,
3480–82, discussed infra Part V.
15. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089
(1972); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV.
1 (2002); John A. Lovett, A Bend in the Road: Easement Relocation and Pliability in
the New Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, 38 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2005)
[hereinafter Lovett, A Bend in the Road].
16. Professor Litvinoff likewise suggested that good faith has two
components, which he described as “a psychological and an ethical component.”
Litvinoff, supra note 1, at 1649. “The former,” he said,
would consist of a belief that one is acting according to law, and is
designated as a good faith-belief. The latter would consist in conducting
oneself according to moral standards, and is designated as good faithprobity, or good faith-honesty, and is germane to ideas of loyalty and
respect for the pledged word.
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acts in good faith in the property law context when he honestly believes he
is the rightful owner of the thing he is possessing or honestly believes that
his ownership extends to all the land that his improvements are occupying.
Honesty is the fundamental requirement of a good faith actor in property
law. If someone knows that he is not the rightful owner of land or of a
corporeal movable, that he has no lawful basis upon which to rest his
occupation or possession, or that his improvements extend beyond the actual
limits of his ownership, he necessarily is a bad faith possessor.
The second component of good faith in Louisiana property law is
carefulness. A good faith actor in property law is someone who not only
honestly believes he is the owner or rightful occupier of the thing at issue, but
he also was at least minimally careful when he built an improvement or took
possession of a corporeal movable or immovable. Unlike honesty, however,
carefulness is a relative criterion. The standard of carefulness varies quite
considerably in the four situations studied in this Article. In some instances,
the presumption of good faith protects the good faith claimant by only
requiring that she not ignore obvious red flags.17 In other cases, the nature of
the marketplace can insulate an acquirer and entitle her to presume a vendor
has title unless red flags appear or unusual circumstances should alert her to
the need for greater scrutiny of the vendor’s ownership.18 In other cases, the
claimant must rely on a written instrument that on its face is translative of
ownership—for instance, a written act of sale, donation, or exchange—and
also not be aware of any significant defects in title.19 Finally, in the context of
acquisitive prescription, the claimant’s reliance on a written act must also be
reasonable in light of all objective circumstances.20
In general, then, particularly in the context of encroaching building
servitudes and accession, good faith works in a relatively simple—though
not simplistic—crystalline, on-and-off manner.21 In those areas, courts

Id. He also recognized that, often, it is difficult to disentangle these two
components of good faith, noting that “both can coexist in a person’s conscience”
and that sometimes it is “just one thing compounded of two ingredients, or a single
coin with two sides.” Id. at 1650.
17. See generally LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 670, discussed infra Part II.
18. See generally id. arts. 518, 521–24, discussed infra Part III.
19. See generally id. art. 487, discussed infra Part IV.
20. See generally id. art. 3480, discussed infra Part V.
21. Infra Parts I, III. For the distinction between crystalline rules and muddy
standards, see generally Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN.
L. REV. 577 (1988). For the utility of mechanistic, on-and-off rules in the linguistic
economy of property law, see generally Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property:
Form, Context and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105 (2003). For the author’s views
on the rules versus standards debate as it plays out in Louisiana, see generally John A.
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employ relatively mechanistic tests to determine whether good faith exists,
often focusing solely on the claimant’s subjective belief that he was the
owner of the property involved and his lack of awareness of defects in his
title.22 In those cases, courts seem to employ an intuitive notion of fairness
or common morality.23 In short, they focus primarily on the honesty
component of good faith and worry less about carefulness.
In the context of the bona fide purchaser doctrine and ten-year
acquisitive prescription regarding immovables, however, courts employ
more stylized, complex, and case-specific approaches that consider not only
the claimant’s subjective belief that he is possessing rightfully but also the
transactional and objective reasonableness of that belief.24 In these cases,
honesty remains a prerequisite to good faith status, but carefulness becomes
a higher priority and attracts more rigorous judicial scrutiny—even though
good faith is still presumed.
When Louisiana courts consider the carefulness of the alleged good faith
actor in property law, they also quite frequently ask questions about the
relative carelessness of the person who allowed the good faith claimant to
come into possession of the thing in dispute.25 In this sense, evaluation of one
party’s alleged good faith in property law usually involves, at least to some
degree, a relational inquiry. If a court finds someone to be a good faith
encroacher, acquirer, purchaser, or possessor, usually the other party was not
particularly careful with the thing he owned. The structure of good faith
analysis in Louisiana property law thus can be visualized using a simple
graph. Carefulness forms the horizontal or x-axis, and honesty forms the
vertical or y-axis. On this graph, all four of the examples of good faith analysis
studied in this Article—good faith encroachers under Article 670, good faith
purchasers of corporeal movables, and good faith possessors for purposes of

Lovett, Love, Loyalty and the Louisiana Civil Code: Rules, Standards and Hybrid
Discretion in a Mixed Jurisdiction, 72 LA. L. REV. 923 (2012).
22. See generally infra Parts II, IV.
23. See Thomas Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1849 (2007) (arguing that property as an institution can only
function well if most people recognize that property is a moral right and if
property rules correspond with common sense notions of morality). Merrill and
Smith briefly discuss the subjects of this essay from the common law perspective
and note the importance of good faith in adverse possession, the good faith
purchaser doctrine, accession, and building encroachments. Id. at 1874–79.
24. See generally infra Parts III, V.
25. See cases discussed infra notes 90–92 and accompanying text; William
Frantz & Co. v. Fink, 52 So. 131 (La. 1910) (on rehearing), and La. Lift & Equip.
Co. v. Eizel, 770 So. 2d 859 (La. Ct. App. 2000), discussed infra at notes 152–189
and accompanying text.
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accession and acquisitive prescription—are located at the same point along
the y-axis, all requiring a foundational level of honesty.
What differentiates the good faith analyses studied here is their placement
on the x-axis—that is, the degree of carefulness required. A good faith
encroacher under Article 670 must demonstrate only a minimal amount of
carefulness—really nothing more than the absence of outright carelessness.26 A
good faith possessor for purposes of accession is located somewhat to the right
of the Article 670 encroacher on the x-axis because she must possess in reliance
on some act translative of ownership and cannot be aware of any defects in her
title, but she generally is not subject to a test of objective reasonableness. In
other words, a good faith possessor for purposes of accession must be honest
and careful enough that she relied on a written act, but no extra measure of
carefulness is required. Close by, but somewhat further along the x-axis, is the
good faith acquirer under the bona fide purchaser doctrine, a person who is
presumed to be in good faith but might not be rewarded with that status if some
special circumstances of her acquisition or purchase should make her aware that
her transferor was not the rightful owner. The would-be good faith acquirer
under this doctrine often must meet an implied test of objective reasonableness,
in which market circumstances can weigh heavily for or against good faith
status. Finally, located at the furthest point on the x-axis is the good faith
possessor for purposes of acquisitive prescription, a claimant who must rely on
an act translative of ownership and whose reliance must be objectively
reasonable.
Figure One

26. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 670 (2018).

1170

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

Another way to imagine the structure of good faith in Louisiana property
law is to visualize a sine wave that oscillates above and below a baseline.
When the level of complexity of the good faith analysis is relatively low—
that is, when honesty and a very minimal level of carefulness is all that is
required—as in the case of encroaching buildings and accession, the curve
dips below the baseline. When the level of complexity of the good faith
analysis is high—that is, when honesty and either implied or explicit objective
reasonableness is required—as in the case of the good faith purchaser doctrine
and ten-year prescription of immovables, the curve rises above the baseline.27
Generally speaking, when the value of the property interest that is subject to
entitlement shifting rises, as with the bona fide purchase doctrine and ten-year
acquisitive prescription, the complexity and rigor of good faith analysis
increases.28 Conversely, when the property interests at stake are more modest,
as with encroaching buildings and accession, the complexity and rigor of the
good faith analysis is less demanding and thus dips below the baseline.29
Figure Two

Complexity of Good Faith Analysis

Bona Fide Purchaser

Ten-Year Acquisitive Prescription

Value of Property Interests at Stake

Encroaching Buildings

Accession

27. In a true sine wave, the amplitude of the wave, that is, the distance above
and below the base line, is invariable. In Louisiana property law, the complexity
and intensity of the good faith analysis will vary from institution to institution.
28. The good faith transferee under the bona fide purchase doctrine will either
be entitled to full reimbursement of the purchase price of the movable in dispute
or actually acquire ownership, and the good faith possessor under ten-year
acquisitive prescription will acquire ownership or other real rights of the
immovable in dispute. See infra Parts II, IV.
29. The good faith encroacher will acquire only a predial servitude permitting
an encroaching building to remain in place and the good faith possessor in
accession will obtain only ownership of civil or natural fruits or various
reimbursement rights. See infra Parts I, III.
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Regardless of how one visualizes the spectrum of good faith analyses
required under Louisiana property law, good faith is always present. It
functions like the water running in a navigable river or stream. Sometimes
the water level runs high. Sometimes it runs low. The surrounding terrain
may consist of flat rules of exclusion and contract. But the current of good
faith frequently provides courts with a malleable, lubricating, and decisionmaking tool when property rights are subject to sudden transformations.
Good faith helps courts determine whether a landowner must allow
room for an innocent encroacher. It helps courts decide whether an original
owner of a lost or stolen movable must pay a subsequent purchaser to
reacquire possession or whether an owner of a corporeal movable has
entirely lost his right to revendicate a movable from a subsequent transferee.
It determines when an owner must reimburse a possessor for his contribution
to a thing possessed without the consent of the owner. Finally, and most
radically, it signals when a possessor of an immovable can acquire
ownership or other real rights with only ten years of continuous possession.
In this Article, these strong currents of good faith are traced in the
order in which the relevant titles of the Civil Code were revised.30 Part I
addresses the undefined and relatively simple requirement of good faith in
the acquisition of an encroaching building servitude. Part II analyzes the
pervasive and more complex decision-making role of good faith in four
different scenarios encompassed within Louisiana’s version of the bona
fide purchaser doctrine applicable to the transfer of ownership of
movables. Part III examines the good/bad faith possessor distinction as a
rough shorthand, allocative tool in the law of accession as it relates to
immovables. Part IV focuses on the contextualizing function of good faith
in ten-year acquisitive prescription in relation to immovables. This Article
concludes by imagining what Louisiana property would look like if good
faith considerations were banished. This final, albeit hypothetical, view
reveals that the continuing presence of good faith in Louisiana property
law makes the institution of property law more nuanced and ethically
responsive to common sense notions of morality and, in particular, the
principle that persons who benefit from rules that shift property
entitlements should be honest and demonstrate at least a modicum of
carefulness when they acquire new things or rights.31

30. By helping to make good faith an explicit, though flexible, prerequisite
in the case of encroaching buildings and by building upon prior doctrine,
modernizing and further rationalizing the role of good faith in the other three
cases, Professor Yiannopoulos deepened the currents of good faith in Louisiana
property law.
31. Merrill & Smith, supra note 23.
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I. ENCROACHING BUILDINGS: ARTICLE 670
Act 514 of the 1977 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature was
the second of many sweeping acts revising Louisiana property law in the
1970s.32 Article 670 of the Civil Code appears in the portion of the act
revising the law of “legal servitudes.”33 It codifies several attempts by
Louisiana courts to solve a frequently recurring property law problem—a
building constructed by one property owner that encroaches on the
property of his neighbor. Article 670 allows for the creation of a predial
servitude to permit the encroaching building to remain on the neighbor’s
property when
a landowner constructs in good faith a building that encroaches on
an adjacent estate and the owner of that estate [the servient estate
owner] does not complain within a reasonable time after he knew
or should have known of the encroachment, or in any event
complains only after the construction is substantially completed.34
The servitude, however, does not come for free; the owner of the building,
the new dominant estate owner, must pay “compensation for the value of
the servitude taken and for any other damage that the neighbor has
suffered.”35 Finally, the servitude only comes into existence if a court,
exercising its discretion, decides to permit the building to remain.36
Although Article 670 makes acquisition of an encroaching building
servitude dependent on a showing that the building at issue was
constructed “in good faith,” the article does not define the term good faith.
Good faith, however, always formed a crucial but problematic part of prior
32. Act No. 514, 1977 La. Acts 1309 revised the law of predial servitudes in
Title IV of Book II of the Civil Code. The previous year, Act No. 103, 1976 La.
Acts 321 was enacted to revise the law of personal servitudes, including usufruct,
habitation, and right of use, in Title III of Book II of the Civil Code.
33. Legal servitudes, such as the encroaching building servitude arising under
Article 670, are “limitations on ownership established by law for the benefit of
the general public or for the benefit of particular persons.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 659 (2018) (emphasis added).
34. Id. art. 670 (emphasis added).
35. Id. The owner of an encroaching building who acquires a predial
servitude under Article 670 acquires the servitude for the benefit of his estate, that
is, the dominant estate upon which most of the encroaching building exists.
Meanwhile the predial servitude burdens the other estate, the encroached upon or
servient estate. See id. art. 646 (“A predial servitude is a charge on a servient estate
for the benefit of a dominant estate.”).
36. Art. 670.
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caselaw in which courts often struggled with a gap in the Civil Code of
1870.37 Article 508 of that code gave restitution-based protection to an
evicted possessor who had constructed “plantations, edifices or works” on
the land of another person as long as he had “possessed bona fide.”38
Article 503 of the same code, in turn, defined a “bona fide possessor” as
someone “who possesses as owner by virtue of an act sufficient in terms
to transfer property, the defects of which he was ignorant.”39 Two
problems arose in applying these two articles to encroaching building
disputes. First, Article 508, the source of current Articles 496 and 497 of
the Civil Code,40 actually addressed a different situation—a construction
situated entirely on another person’s property and not a minor
encroachment. Second, because an encroaching building owner would
almost never possess a narrow strip of his neighbor’s property occupied
by his encroaching building by virtue of a title, an encroaching building
owner could never really be a “bona fide possessor.”
To remedy this gap in the law, the drafters of Article 670 drew on two
different groups of sources. First, they borrowed from “continental civil
codes,”41 some of which incorporate what law and economics scholars

37. Id. cmt. b.
38. Much like current Louisiana Civil Code article 496, Article 508 of the
1870 Civil Code stated that the record owner could not demolish constructions
made by a good faith possessor; instead, he must choose “either to reimburse the
value of the materials and the price of workmanship, or to reimburse a sum equal
to the enhanced value of the soil.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 508 (1870).
39. Id. art. 503.
40. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 487 cmt. a (2018).
41. Art. 670 cmt. a. Although the revision comment does not mention which
continental civil codes the drafters had in mind, they likely drew on Italian and
German, but not French, sources. Article 938 of the Italian Civil Code states:
If a portion of the adjoining land is occupied in good faith in the
construction of a building, and the owner of that land does not object
within three months of the day on which construction began, the court,
taking account of the circumstances, can attribute the ownership of the
building and the occupied soil to the builder. The builder is required to
pay the owner of the soil double the value of the area occupied, as well
as compensation for damages.
Codice Civile [C.c.] [Civil Code] art. 938 (2018) (It.) Paragraph 912 of the
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (“BGB”) [German Civil Code] reads:
If the owner of the soil in construction of a building has built beyond the
border line without intention or gross negligence, the neighbor must
suffer the building unless before or right after the overtaking of the
borderline he has objected. The neighbor must be compensated with a
cash rent.
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today call “liability rule” solutions to the problem of encroaching
buildings.42 These continental civil codes allow the encroaching building
owner to acquire a property right vis-à-vis the adjoining landowner
through the use of a liability rule mechanism, that is, by paying a judicially
determined amount of compensation for either a permanent or temporary
property right on the adjoining land.43
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] para. 912 (2018). In contrast,
French law denies the encroaching building owner any relief at all in this situation
because it considers the encroachment an invasion of the adjoining owner’s property
rights and because Article 545 of the French Civil Code only allows a compensated
taking of private property for a public, but not a private, use. These translations and
insights are taken from UGO MATTEI, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW: A
COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC INTRODUCTION 137–39, 139 nn.55, 58 (2000).
42. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 15, at 1092. Calabresi and Melamed
famously envisioned two mechanisms for the protection of property entitlements.
When an entitlement is protected by a “property rule,” it can only be modified,
transferred, or terminated through a consensual transaction if the price is determined
by the mutual consent of the parties. When a property entitlement is subject to a
“liability rule,” however, it can be modified, transferred, or destroyed in exchange
for an objectively determined price, that is, a price set by a court. Lovett, A Bend in
the Road, supra note 15, at 9–10. For example, when the state exercises its power
of eminent domain and takes a person’s property in exchange for just compensation,
the condemnee’s property is protected only by a liability rule. See Lovett, A Bend
in the Road, supra note 15, at 10–16, for a more detailed explanation of the property
rule-liability rule paradigm. Article 670 of the Civil Code similarly allows the
encroaching building owner to acquire a predial servitude on the adjoining land and
the adjoining landowner is compensated by an amount determined objectively by
the court. Art. 670.
43. In terms of economic efficiency, Mattei ranks the German solution to the
encroaching building problem, along with the English, as the most efficient,
followed in descending order by the Italian rule, the United States rule, and the
French rule. MATTEI, supra note 41, at 140. Thus, by blending the German and
Italian solutions in Article 670’s liability rule solution, Professor Yiannopoulos
aligned Louisiana with the most advanced civilian legal reasoning, at least
according to Mattei. In England, as Mattei explains, “the problem is handled either
by means of estoppel or by refusing the injunction despite the fact that good faith
does not excuse trespass.” Id. at 137. For an insightful discussion of the approach of
United States courts to this problem, see THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH,
PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 57–60 (2d ed. 2012). Merrill and Smith opine
that in most United States jurisdictions, if faced with “an unintentional
encroachment, only slight damage to the plaintiff’s [adjoining landowner’s] interest,
and grave hardship to the defendant if removal of the encroachment were required,
most American courts today would probably deny injunctive relief and only award
damages.” MERRILL & SMITH, supra, at 57. Functionally, this solution is the same
as provided in Article 670. Merrill and Smith describe a “person who violates
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Second, the drafters acknowledged that in several Louisiana cases,
courts had allowed encroaching walls “built in good faith and with the
acquiescence of the adjoining landowner” to remain on a neighbor’s
property.44 Article 670, however, does not convey much about what good
faith means in this context. For example, it does not instruct whether a
property owner must conduct a survey to ascertain the actual boundaries of
his property before construction begins. It does not indicate whether good
faith is presumed if the construction took place under a previous owner. It
does not even explain whether good faith is measured in subjective or
objective terms. In short, Article 670 provides no guidance about the degree
of carefulness that an Article 670 claimant must demonstrate to qualify as a
good faith encroacher. It appears to require nothing more than some base
level of honesty and perhaps the absence of utter recklessness.
Happily, though, the vagueness of “good faith” in Article 670 has not
proven to be a terrible problem, as judicial decisions handed down after its
adoption have filled in a number of these gaps and, perhaps with one
notable exception, produced sensible results. In Bushnell v. Artis, for
instance, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal refused to interpret
the good faith requirement of Article 670 in light of Article 487, which
now defines good faith for purposes of accession and requires possession
by virtue of an act translative of ownership.45 Instead, it found that the
claimant satisfied the good faith requirement because she always thought
her property line extended to a fence constructed by a neighbor.46 Further,
the court implicitly and quickly determined that the claimant’s belief was
not wholly unreasonable—the claimant had no reason to be aware that the
neighbor had mistakenly offset the fence from the actual boundary line
and the neighbor never complained when the claimant constructed her
home in a 15 foot strip of land apparently made available by the misplaced
fence.47 In short, the claimant in Bushnell encroached in good faith even
another’s property rights without knowing that he or she is doing so as a ‘good
faith’ violator” and “someone who knowingly violates another’s property rights”
as a “‘bad faith’ violator.” MERRILL & SMITH, supra, at 58.
44. Art. 670 cmt. c. In Pokoroy v. Pratt, 34 So. 706, 707 (La. 1903), the court
stressed the acquiescence of the adjoining landowner who sought to have the
encroaching wall demolished, without discussing the builder’s good or bad faith.
In Morehead v. Smith, 225 So. 2d 729, 731, 735 (La. Ct. App. 1969) (on
rehearing), the court easily found that the defendant property owner constructed
a building with an encroaching wall in good faith because he had acted in
accordance with a survey performed by a registered surveyor.
45. Bushnell v. Artis, 445 So. 2d 152, 154 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
46. Id.
47. Id.
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though she lacked an act translative of ownership describing the occupied
land and never conducted a survey before commencing construction.48 The
court essentially presumed that her encroachment was honest and did not
inquire deeply into her carefulness.
In a later case, Antis v. Miller, the same appellate court, citing Bushnell,
reached a similar result but went further in clarifying the relevant factors in
an Article 670 good faith analysis.49 In Antis, the court held that the
defendant was entitled to an Article 670 servitude with respect to a 3.85-foot
strip of land upon which he accidentally built a garage in the absence of a
pre-construction survey.50 The court determined specifically that the
defendant was in good faith because (1) he and his ancestors had mowed
and otherwise maintained the strip of land in controversy, (2) a row of pine
trees had created the impression that the boundary was further away, and (3)
the defendant always believed his property extended to the pine trees.51
Significantly, the court refused to require a survey for good faith encroacher
status, observing that “[i]f a prior survey . . . were a requisite for good faith,
there would be no need for Article 670” because “if all constructions were
preceded by an accurate survey, there would never be an encroachment.”52
In short, good faith here turns on simple subjective honesty and a modest
degree of carefulness in the circumstances.
In Winingder v. Balmer, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal
resolved another question when it affirmed the trial court’s implicit finding
of good faith on the part of a New Orleans homeowner claiming an Article
670 servitude.53 In that case, the court held that the claimant satisfied the
good faith requirement in light of two significant facts: (1) the encroaching
house had been constructed more than 80 years prior to the litigation; and
(2) the defendant whose property suffered the encroachment actually knew
about the problem at the time she purchased her property.54 In other words,
when the encroachment precedes the claimant’s acquisition of the
property, the court will presume the encroachment occurred in good faith

48. See id.
49. Antis v. Miller, 524 So. 2d 71 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
50. Id. at 76–77. In Antis, the defendant became aware that his garage likely
encroached on his neighbor’s property after approximately 80% of the
construction was complete, at which point he notified his neighbor. Id. at 73.
51. Id. at 72–73, 76.
52. Id. at 76.
53. Winingder v. Balmer, 632 So. 2d 408 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
54. Id. at 410, 413.
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and implicitly charge the servient estate owner with constructive
knowledge of the encroachment.55
Following Winingder, another Louisiana appellate court held that a
neighbor who rebuilt an existing boathouse and pier in the same place as
a previous owner resulting in a 4.5 feet encroachment across the boundary
line was similarly entitled to an Article 670 servitude.56 The court justified
this conclusion by observing that the encroachment pre-dated the servient
estate’s acquisition of the adjacent lake bottom and by noting that the
encroacher was unaware that his structures crossed the boundary line.57
On the other hand, as the court in Ensenat v. Edgecombe observed, a
property owner who constructs his encroaching driveway and fence in the
midst of a hotly litigated boundary dispute with his neighbor and,
moreover, does so while his neighbor is out of town, is barred from any
relief under Article 670.58 As the circumstances in Ensenat suggest, a
fundamentally dishonest or mischievous claimant will not be considered a
good faith encroacher.
Finally, in Hayes v. Gunn, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal
confronted a simple factual scenario that nevertheless divided the court
and revealed that Article 670 does not always produce tidy outcomes.59 In
that case, a woman acquired two adjoining lots and then transferred one of
the lots to her daughter and son-in-law, the eventual plaintiffs, who built a
“covered carport” on the woman’s remaining lot because they did not have
sufficient room on their own lot.60 The woman gave her daughter and sonin-law oral permission to construct the carport and use part of her lot as a
driveway.61 Later, a bank acquired the woman’s remaining lot, which was
then purchased by another person, the defendant Gunn, who demanded the
daughter and son-in-law stop using the driveway and remove the carport.62
In response, the son-in-law filed suit, claiming the acquisition of an Article
670 servitude with respect to the carport and driveway. 63 The trial court
rejected the claim of an Article 670 servitude, relying on the public records

55. The court in Winingder also cited Bushnell for the proposition that a
claimant under Article 670 is “not required to prove that she is a possessor in good
faith as defined in Louisiana Civil Code article 487.” Id. at 413–14.
56. Atwood v. Hylan, 685 So. 2d 450, 450–53 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
57. Id.
58. See Ensenat v. Edgecombe, 677 So. 2d 138, 144 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
59. Hayes v. Gunn, 115 So. 3d 1141 (La. Ct. App. 2013).
60. Id. at 1142.
61. Id. at 1142–43.
62. Id. at 1143.
63. Id.
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doctrine.64 The court of appeal, in a split decision, affirmed, holding that
the plaintiff did not obtain an Article 670 servitude because he and his wife
had constructed the carport with the explicit permission of the original
owner.65
There are a few problems with this decision. First, it is not clear that
Article 670 should have been applicable to a covered carport or driveway
as neither structure is obviously a building.66 Second, although the plaintiff
and his wife clearly knew they had no ownership interest on the adjacent
lot when they constructed the carport and driveway and lacked any act
translative of ownership to the adjoining lot, it is not clear that this fact
alone should disqualify them from claiming good faith for purposes of
Article 670. Here, the majority decision conflates one of the key
requirements of Article 487 of the Civil Code—that a good faith possessor
have an act translative of ownership—with Article 670 in its determination
that the plaintiff was not entitled to a servitude.67
In her astute dissent in Hayes, Judge Cooks pointed out that in
previous decisions the Third Circuit Court of Appeal had rejected the
notion that an Article 670 claimant must possess by an act translative of
ownership and further observed that “[t]here is no good faith bright line
test solely dependent on an act translative of title when applying Article
670.”68 Moreover, she noticed that Article 670 contemplates “good faith
in fact” and implicates “honesty” or “lawfulness of purpose.”69 She
concluded by arguing that the eventual purchaser in Hayes should not have
been permitted to rely on the fact that the encroaching party’s interest in
the constructions was unrecorded because Article 670 is designed to
protect just such interests.70 After all, she notes, the plaintiff and his wife
“are exactly the type of landowners who, in good faith, construct a
building that encroaches on the neighboring land to which no objection is

64. Id. at 1144.
65. Id. at 1146–47.
66. At best, they might be classified as “other constructions permanently
attached to the ground.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 643 (2018). For examples of
such constructions, see id. rev. cmt c. This is not the only instance in which
Louisiana courts have applied Article 670 to structures that are more accurately
characterized as other constructions rather than buildings. See SGC Land, L.L.C.
v. La. Mid-Stream Gas Servs., 939 F. Supp. 2d 612, 620 (W.D. La. 2013)
(applying Article 670 to a pipeline constructed in good faith); Mary v. QEP
Energy Co., 2017 WL 6273739, at *12 (W.D. La. Dec. 6, 2017) (same).
67. Hayes, 115 So. 3d at 1144–47.
68. Id. at 1149 (Cooks, J., dissenting).
69. Id.
70. Id.
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timely made.”71 Admittedly, Hayes is an outlier. The claimant in that case
built his carport on his neighbor’s property honestly and carefully but was
not entitled to an Article 670 servitude. Perhaps the best explanation for
the majority decision is that the majority viewed the plaintiff and his wife
as precarious possessors and thus not entitled to acquire any property
rights in the adjoining property.72
All of these decisions applying Article 670 demonstrate that good faith
in this context functions in a relatively straightforward, on-and-off
manner. Rather than engage in complex, highly stylized determinations as
to whether an owner acted reasonably in light of all the transactional
circumstances, courts make quick, rough, and ready determinations
because they are largely focused on the honesty component of good faith
and specifically whether the claimant knew he was encroaching when he
started his construction project. It is also true that courts often look at a
number of objective facts—the presence of fences or other boundary
markers, the degree of intrusion, the age of the encroachment, and the
neighbor’s knowledge, for example—to make an assessment about the
reasonableness of the encroachment, but in the end, their assessments are
not highly complex. Courts also indulge in a generous presumption of
good faith when they encounter the frequent problem of long-standing
encroachments created by prior owners.
II. GOOD FAITH PURCHASER DOCTRINE
Good faith has always played an important role in resolving disputes
that arise when a person who is not actually the owner of a movable
purports to sell the movable to another. The Louisiana Civil Code
addresses this subject in Chapter 3 of Title 1 of Book II, entitled “Transfer
of Ownership by Agreement.” Article 523 of the Civil Code lies at the
heart of that chapter. It states simply and elegantly, “An acquirer of a

71. Id. Judge Cooks also shrewdly pointed out that the defendant was hardly
blameworthy in this case—she was “well-informed about the encroachment
before purchasing the property and purchased it with full knowledge of its
existence,” which suggests that her and the bank’s mutual knowledge of the
encroachment likely affected the purchase price for the lot. Id. at 1150.
72. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3437 (2018). Precarious possession, of course,
is the possession of a thing with the permission of or on behalf of the actual owner
or another possessor. Id. For more on precarious possession and the tendency of
Louisiana courts to classify acquisitive prescription claimants as precarious
possessors in some circumstances, see John A. Lovett, Precarious Possession, 77
LA. L. REV. 617 (2017) [hereinafter Lovett, Precarious Possession].
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corporeal movable is in good faith for purposes of this Chapter unless he
knows, or should have known, that the transferor was not the owner.”73
The drafters of this article, new for the Louisiana Civil Code, drew
inspiration from a wide range of civilian sources, including the German
and Greek Civil Codes.74 This provision embeds a clear presumption of
good faith in its lapidary prose and links good faith to a broad reasonable
person standard yet leaves plenty of room for judicial interpretation.
Crucially, this article brings both honesty and carefulness into the good
faith calculus.
To understand how this conception of good faith functions, one must
first consider the purpose of the bona fide purchaser doctrine itself. The
doctrine seeks to reconcile two important but often conflicting policy
interests.75 On the one hand, the doctrine must protect security of
ownership as embodied in the Civil Code’s famous admonition: “The sale
of a thing belonging to another does not convey ownership.”76 On the other
hand, it also must protect security of transactions, as illustrated in Article
2279 of the French Civil Code, which equates possession of movables with
ownership of or title to movables.77 The concept of good faith, it turns out,
plays a crucial role in balancing these two competing interests.
As Professor Ugo Mattei points out, every legal system must decide
what to do with so-called transfers a non domino—“transfers from someone
who is not the actual owner of the movable but who has physical possession
of it to a third party who in good faith relies on him or her being owner.”78
Such transfers pose “a classic conflict between two innocent parties . . . who
claim ownership over the same piece of movable property.”79 As Mattei
explains, two rival paradigms for solving this classic problem have
competed over the ages in the Western legal tradition.
One solution, originating in Roman law, gives ownership of the
movable to the original owner, regardless of how the intermediary took
73. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 523.
74. See id. cmt. a (acknowledging that this provision was “new” and “based
in part on Article 1037 of the Greek Civil Code and Sec. 932(2) of the German
Civil Code”).
75. DIAN TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & DAVID GRUNING, SALES § 7.1, in 24 LOUISIANA
CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2012); Se. Equip. Co., Inc. v. Office of State Police, 437 So. 2d
1184, 1186 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (acknowledging the “competing equities between the
true owner and the good faith purchaser who are both innocent victims”).
76. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 245.
77. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 2279 (1804) (Fr.) (“In the case of
movables, possession is equivalent to a title.”).
78. MATTEI, supra note 41, at 106–07 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 107.
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possession of the thing, and only considers good faith if the final possessor
asserts “usuacapio—[that is,] adverse possession for a long time[].”80 In
this Romanist view, good faith is relatively unimportant and comes into
the picture only after a significant passage of time and overt possession.
The second solution, originating in Germanic customary law, asks
how the original owner relinquished possession. If the original owner
voluntarily relinquishes possession by turning over the movable to
someone like a faithless trustee, then the eventual possessor should
prevail, regardless of her bona fides or mala fides, because the person best
positioned to prevent the loss is the original owner.81 Under this German
view, however, if the original owner loses possession involuntarily
because the movable has been lost or stolen, then the original owner will
prevail because he lost the property “against his will.”82 Notice that in this
Germanic formulation the original owner’s carefulness or carelessness
matters a great deal, and the subsequent acquirer’s honesty or carefulness
is immaterial.
According to Mattei, most European legal systems, including notably
Germany and Switzerland, worked out a compromise. In essence, these
systems followed the Germanic approach—protecting the owner if he
loses possession involuntarily but rewarding the eventual transferee if the
original owner voluntarily departs with possession.83 These systems,
however, made one crucial qualification: when the original owner entrusts
the movable to the intermediary, the third-party transferee is protected
only if she is in good faith.84
After an initial 170-year period that charitably has been described as
a “schizophrenic” mélange of first principles favoring security of
ownership spliced with numerous codal and jurisprudential exceptions in
favor of the good faith purchaser,85 Louisiana’s contemporary bona fide

80. Id.
81. Id. at 107–08.
82. Id. at 107.
83. Id. at 106–08.
84. Id. at 107.
85. Marie Breaux Stroud, The Sale of a Movable Belonging to Another: A Code
in Search of a Solution, 4 TUL. CIV. L. F. 41, 47 (1988). See id. at 43–52, for a concise
history of the bona fide purchaser doctrine from 1808 until the 1979 revision.
According to several commentators, much of the bona fide purchaser doctrine was
introduced into Louisiana by courts borrowing from the common law and calling the
borrowing “natural law.” Id. at 49. As the inimitable Mitchel Franklin put it: “This is,
then, the Louisiana palimpsest: the code written over by the case law, borrowing
Anglo-American concepts, under the self-deluding disguise that they are natural law.”
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purchaser doctrine illustrates the modern civil law compromise. In fact,
the current Louisiana Civil Code heightens the importance of the eventual
transferee’s good faith by making that characteristic crucial in four distinct
situations: (1) in the case of lost or stolen things;86 (2) in the case of an
original owner who is induced by fraud or some other vice of consent to
part with a movable;87 (3) in the case of either a duplicitous or forgetful
owner who sells a thing to one person and then turns around and sells the
same thing to another person before the first vendee takes possession;88
and (4) the always difficult case of the owner who entrusts his movable to
a person who proves to be an untrustworthy depositary or bailee.89
In all four corners of the bona fide purchaser doctrine, two questions
recur. First, given that the honesty of a good faith acquirer is generally
presumed in this context, what degree of carefulness is required? Second,
has the Civil Code or courts provided any useful short cuts for deciding
whether a bona fide purchaser claimant was careful enough in his
acquisition of a corporeal movable?
A. Lost or Stolen Things
The first bona fide purchaser problem concerns a lost or stolen
movable. Here, two Civil Code articles provide dueling conceptions of the
right of the original owner. First, Article 521 states:
One who has possession of a lost or stolen thing may not transfer
its ownership to another. For purposes of this Chapter, a thing is
stolen when one has taken possession of it without the consent of
its owner. A thing is not stolen when the owner delivers it or
transfers its ownership to another as a result of fraud.90

Mitchel Franklin, Security of Acquisition and of Transaction: La Possession Vaut
Titre and Bona Fide Purchase, 6 TUL. L. REV. 589, 609 (1932).
86. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 521, 524 (2018).
87. See id. arts. 521–22. The classic example is a seller who transfers
possession of a movable upon receipt of a check that is later dishonored. See, e.g.,
Flatte v. Nichols, 96 So. 2d 477 (La. 1957); Trumbull Chevrolet Sales Co. v.
Maxwell, 142 So. 2d 805 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
88. See id. art. 518.
89. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 520 (1979), repealed by Act. No. 125, § 1, 1981
La. Acts 351. In light of the repeal of Article 520, this situation must now be
resolved solely with resort to Louisiana caselaw, particularly, William Frantz &
Co. v. Fink, 62 So. 131 (La. 1903). See infra Part II.D.
90. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 521 (2018).
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Putting aside the distinction between theft and fraud for the moment, this
article appears to create absolute protection for the owner of the lost or
stolen thing because, as Professor Yiannopoulos explains, the original
owner “may reclaim it in the hands of the finder or of the thief as well as
in the hands of any acquirer who purchased it in good faith for fair
value.”91 Although Professor Yiannopoulos’s statement is undoubtedly
true in the case of a good faith acquirer who purchases directly from a thief
or finder, the article does not solve the more difficult and common case of
an acquirer who purchases from an intermediary who took possession for
a thief or finder. For that case, one must turn to Article 524, which states:
The owner of a lost or stolen movable may recover it from a
possessor who bought it in good faith at a public auction or from
a merchant customarily selling similar things on reimbursing the
purchase price. The former owner of a lost, stolen, or abandoned
movable that has been sold by authority of law may not recover it
from the purchaser.92
This article complicates the superficially absolute rule of Article 521 in
two crucial respects. First, it eliminates the original owner’s right of
revendication if the eventual purchaser acquires the thing at a publicly
authorized sale. Second, and more importantly, it significantly limits the
original owner’s right of revendication by requiring the owner to pay the
purchaser his purchase price if the eventual purchaser acquires the thing at
either a public auction or “from a merchant customarily selling similar
things,” when the purchaser made such an acquisition in “good faith.”93 In
other words, although the original owner can theoretically regain her
movable in the market ouvert case,94 the law guarantees the good faith
purchaser restitution in the form of compensation for the value of the
movable.
The revision comments to Article 524 instruct that this provision
reproduces part of the 1870 Civil Code but overturns prior jurisprudence
to avoid the difficulties inherent in applying the law of acquisitive
prescription of movables while protecting buyers in common commercial

91. A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 13:9, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE at 787 (5th ed. 2015).
92. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 524.
93. Id.
94. Market overt (or ouvert) sales are those in which goods are offered for
sale at a public fair or market or a shop that regularly trades in those goods. Stroud,
supra note 85, at 44.
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transactions.95 On its face, then, Article 524 appears to tip the scales in
favor of the second of the two relatively innocent parties—here, the good
faith purchaser—in the interest of protecting everyday commerce.96
Unfortunately, only a handful of reported Louisiana decisions have
applied the good faith definition articulated in Article 523 in the context
of stolen goods, and only two stand out for their contrasting interpretation
of the good faith requirement in the context of stolen goods.97
First, in Brown & Root, Inc. v. Southeast Equipment Co., the Louisiana
First Circuit Court of Appeal held that a purchaser of stolen industrial
equipment—a wheeled loader—was in good faith for purposes of Article
524 and thus entitled to reimbursement for its purchase price before it was
required to return the loader to its original owner.98 In that case, when it
bought the loader from an equipment dealer in Houston, the purchaser
95. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 521 rev. cmts. a–b.
96. A fair question to ask is whether Article 524 enables thieves to launder
stolen goods through merchants too easily—particularly when those items are not
easily traceable through a system of registry. On the other hand, this risk might be
a small price to pay for a ready market in second hand goods. To answer these
questions, it would be necessary to conduct empirical studies beyond the scope of
this Article.
97. In a third decision, Se. Equip. Co. v. Office of State Police, 437 So. 2d 1184,
1185–86 (La. Ct. App. 1983), the court applied Article 524, but not Article 523, to
hold that the purchaser of a stolen front-end loader was entitled to reimbursement
for the $54,000 purchase price it paid an intermediary before it had to return the
loader to the original owner. In that case, according to the majority, the parties
effectively stipulated that the purchaser was in good faith, id. at 1185 n.1, and thus,
the question for the court was whether the purchaser acquired the loader from a
“merchant customarily selling similar things” given that it acquired the loader from
a heavy equipment sales company that was acting as an agent or consigner on behalf
of another person, the suspected thief. Id. at 1185–86. The court interpreted Article
524 as only requiring some “dealing” between the good faith purchaser and the
merchant customarily selling similar things, and it therefore held that “if such a
merchant conducts the sale, [Article] 524 applies, whether the merchant is acting as
apparent owner or only as agent for another.” Id. at 1186. Put differently, Article
524 applies “not only to direct sales of movables from the merchant’s own
inventory, but also consignment sales, . . . where the merchant is acting as an agent
on behalf of someone else who purports to be the owner.” Id. at 1185. In dissent,
Judge Redman argued persuasively that the parties’ stipulation that the purchaser
did not know that the loader was not stolen was not a stipulation that the purchaser—
Southeast—“was in good faith” and that, in fact, the ease which another prospective
purchaser learned that the loader had been stolen suggests that Southeast “should
have known” that the transferor was not the owner. Id. at 1187 (Redman, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
98. Brown & Root, Inc. v. Se. Equip. Co., 470 So. 2d 516, 518 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
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either did not notice or worry about the fact that the manufacturer’s
original serial number had been gouged out of the loader’s metal frame on
the front of the vehicle and a fictitious serial number had been glued in its
place.99 The court found these facts insufficiently alarming so as to spur
the purchaser to engage in further inquiry as to the purported vendor’s
ownership, particularly in the absence of any indication that the loader’s
$23,000 purchase price loader was unusually low.100 In Brown and Root,
the general presumption of good faith embedded in Article 523 may have
tipped the balance in favor of the purchaser despite the suspicious
conditions of the loader’s serial number.101
Several years later, in Livestock Producers, Inc. v. Littleton, a court
found that an intermediary purchaser of 74 cattle from a cattle dealer who
was trying to sell the cattle quickly did not act in good faith and thus was
not entitled to reimbursement when the purchaser later learned that the
cattle effectively had been stolen from their actual owner—the defendant
Littleton.102 In this complicated tale of cattle swindling, three salient sets
of facts emerged. First, B.L. Littleton, the actual owner, who eventually
sought return of the cattle, had previously tagged and marked the cattle
with his own Texas registered brand—BL—after he had purchased the
cattle from Smith, an apparent owner.103 Second, the rushed sale of the
cattle took place at a cattle auction business run by Ronnie Stratton, doing
business as Livestock Producers, Inc. (“LPI”), the final purchaser of the
74 cattle and the party who eventually sought protection under Article
524.104 Finally, at the time of the rushed intermediate sale, the BL brand,
which actually belonged to Littleton, was referenced in the Louisiana
brand book as belonging to a Coushatta farmer with no connection to
Smith, the person purporting to sell the cows at the auction as owner, or
anyone else connected with the cattle.105 Notably, Smith, the duplicitous

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Livestock Prods., Inc. v. Littleton, 748 So. 2d 537 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
103. Id. at 539. As it turns out, at the time of the first sale from Smith to
Littleton, at which Smith represented himself as a one-half co-owner of 200 cows,
Smith actually owned none of the cattle. This deceit proved to be immaterial,
however, because Smith gave all of the proceeds of the first sale to the actual
original first owner, Glasscock. Id. Thus, by the time Littleton acquired ownership
of the cattle, the first vendor had been paid in full. Id. In some sense, Littleton
created the entire problem by leaving the cattle in Smith’s possession. Id.
104. Id. at 539, 544.
105. Id. at 545.
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intermediary who had been put in possession of the cattle pursuant to a
paid pasturage agreement, was not a regular customer of the auction.106
In these circumstances, the court, distinguishing Brown & Root, held
that the purchaser, Stratton/LPI, was not actually in good faith because, as
an auctioneer and regular player in the cattle trade, he should have been
immediately suspicious when the brands of the cattle offered for sale
appeared to be unconnected to the purported vendor, Smith.107 As the court
noted,
Even though the brand actually belonged to Littleton and was
registered in Texas, not only did Stratton fail to check the brand
registry in neighboring states, but when the brand did not seem to
fit with Smith, he made no further inquiry. Given the freshness of
the brand, Stratton should have at least questioned the ownership
of the cattle. Smith was pressing for a quick, private sale of the
last of the cows from the herd. Stratton moved forward to purchase
the cows and immediately resell them for a quick profit.108
Here, the court engaged in a finely textured assessment of the
reasonableness—of the carefulness—of the purchaser’s actions. That
assessment takes account of not only the quality of the seller’s personal
reputation but also the availability of a de facto registry system in the form
of the state branding books, an apparent red flag in that registry, the
apparently low purchase price for the movables, and the buyer’s
experience in the marketplace.109 One commentator has noted that the case
could have been conceptualized as a faithless entrustment case because the
cows technically were not stolen but rather voluntarily put in Smith’s
possession by Littleton, and thus, the dispute could have been more neatly
solved by application of repealed Article 520. Yet even if Littleton had
been framed as a faithless entrustment case demanding application of
repealed Article 520, good faith would have still been a crucial
consideration as that article itself only protects a “transferee in good faith
for fair value.”110 In short, the court’s conclusion that the third party
purchaser seeking protection of Article 524 in Livestock Producers did not
act in good faith seems entirely sensible. The court’s conclusion takes
account of many of the relevant facts revealing the third party purchaser’s
106. Id. at 540, 545.
107. Id. at 545.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 544–45.
110. LA. CIV. CODE art. 520 (repealed 1981). For discussion of repealed
Article 520 and faithless entrustees, see infra Part II.D.

2018]

GOOD FAITH IN LOUISIANA PROPERTY LAW

1187

relative carelessness in the circumstances by noting the many suspicious
circumstances surrounding the transaction, the ease of further inquiry, and
the purchaser’s experience in this particular kind of market.111
B. Annullable Title
The next bona fide purchaser problem features an original owner or
purported owner who is induced by fraud to relinquish possession of his
corporeal movable—the problem of annullable, or voidable, title. Here,
recall that Article 521 defines “stolen things” quite narrowly as only
including things that have been taken away from the owner without his
consent while excluding things that the owner delivered to another “as a
result of fraud.”112 Two articles define the scope of available remedies to
the owner and professed innocent purchaser in this situation.
First, Article 525 instructs that “the provisions of this Chapter do not
apply to movables that are required by law to be registered in public
records,”113 such as vehicles, mobile homes, and other movables subject
to statutory registration systems.114 Nevertheless, as the revision
comments to this article indicate, Louisiana courts occasionally have
looked to the state’s good faith purchaser doctrine to solve cases in which
parties have failed to comply with these statutory registry regimes.115
Perhaps aware that specialized registration systems would not be
applicable to all fraudulent sale cases and that courts might look to the
good faith purchaser doctrine anyway, the Louisiana Legislature enacted
a specific provision for the case of the annullable title. That provision,
Article 522, states that “[a] transferee of a corporeal movable in good faith
and for fair value retains the ownership of the thing even though the title
of the transferor is annulled on account of a vice of consent.”116

111. Indeed, Sinclair acknowledges that the outcome likely would have been the
same had the court framed Livestock Producers as a faithless entrustment case because
even then the purchaser would not have been able to prove good faith. Spencer
Sinclair, Comment, The Louisiana Good Faith Purchaser Doctrine: Codified
Confusion, 89 TUL. L. REV. 517, 533 (2017).
112. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 521 (2018).
113. Id. art. 525.
114. Sinclair, supra note 111, at 525.
115. Art. 525 rev. cmt. b.
116. Id. art. 522. The revision drafters acknowledge Professor Yiannopoulos’s
influence on this article in their reference to the section of his 1966 treatise in which
he argued that in the case of title annullable on account of fraud, the owner should
not be able to “revendicate the thing in the hands of the good faith acquirer.” Id. cmt
b (citing A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 125 (1966)).
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The modern caselaw relevant to this corner of the good faith purchaser
doctrine, however, is quite sparse. Several decisions stand for the
proposition that when there is a conflict between two innocent parties
resulting from an initial sale induced by presentation of a subsequently
dishonored check by an intermediate purchaser—that is, a classic voidable
title—courts examine the equities of the situation to determine which of
the parties—the initial vendor or a subsequent transferee—is most
responsible for the loss.117 In short, courts inquire into carefulness but
structure that inquiry in a relational manner to determine whose
carelessness was most responsible for the potential loss.
Another complexity arises from the fact that the Vehicle Certificate of
Title Law appears to prevent a marketable title from being obtained in the
absence of compliance with that law.118 Nevertheless, despite this
prohibition, courts in a number of cases have found that an original vendor
who relinquished possession of a valuable motor vehicle without assuring
that the purchaser’s check was actually drawn on sufficient funds is the
more careless party, so a third-party good faith purchaser for value is
entitled to retain possession of the vehicle.119 The only instances in which

117. See, e.g., Flatte v. Nichols, 96 So. 2d 477, 480 (La. 1957); Trumbull
Chevrolet Sales Co. v. Maxwell, 142 So. 2d 805, 806 (La. Ct. App. 1962); Theriac
v. McKeever, 405 So. 2d 354, 357 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
118. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 32:706–706.1 (2018). Yet courts have also held that
the mere failure to comply with the certificate of title law does not void a sale but
only prevents title from being marketable, Theriac, 405 So. 2d at 356, or renders
title “imperfect,” Flatte, 85 So. 2d at 479.
119. Flatte, 96 So. 2d at 480 (concluding that the third-party purchaser was
entitled to retain the vehicle and that the owner-vendor was estopped from
recovering the vehicle because (1) the owner-vendor “knew that [its vendee] was a
dealer and would resell the automobile” and (2) the owner-vendor gave its vendee
possession of the vehicle and clothed the vendee with certain indicia of ownership.
All of this occurred “without ascertaining if the check given by [the vendee] was
good”); Trumbell, 142 So. 2d at 806–07 (affirming the trial court’s finding that “by
its delivery of the vehicle in question and the acceptance of a check in payment
therefor, [the owner-vendor] completed the necessary formalities of a sale, and,
therefore, was solely responsible for laying the basis for the subsequent allegedly
fraudulent transactions”); Theriac, 405 So. 2d at 357 (holding that when purported
owner of truck allowed dealer to obtain possession of truck, along with a signed bill
of sale and an endorsed certificate of title, he clothed dealer with all that he needed
to execute valid transfer, and thus as between purported owner and innocent third
party who purchased vehicle from dealer, the third party had the right to keep the
vehicle and did not owe the purported owner the purchase price). It is unclear
whether LA. REV. STAT. § 32:706(E), as amended in 1989, reverses any of these
decisions. Some commentators note the effect of the entire Vehicle Certificate of
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courts have chosen not to protect third-party purchasers in this context
involve situations in which the original owner did not actually execute any
documents that could be characterized as an instrument conveying or
certifying title to the fraudulent intermediary, and thus, its actions did not
clothe the intermediary with any indicia of ownership.120 In summary, in
the case of annullable title, courts take the eventual transferee’s good faith
for granted unless they find strong evidence of irregularity, and most of
the time courts will focus on the negligence of the original owner who
relinquished possession and created the potentially voidable title.121
C. The Double Sale
The third bona fide purchaser problem differs from the rest in that the
two relatively innocent parties are both transferees from the original
owner. In the case of a double sale, the original owner of a corporeal
movable sells the same object to one person and then to another person
before the first vendee takes possession. Once again, good faith plays a
decisive role in allocating rights. Article 518 supplies the rule for this
scenario:
The ownership of a movable is voluntarily transferred by a
contract between the owner and the transferee that purports to
transfer the ownership of the movable. Unless otherwise provided,
the transfer of ownership takes place as between the parties by the
effect of the agreement and against third persons when the
possession of the movable is delivered to the transferee.
When possession has not been delivered, a subsequent transferee
Title Law, LA. REV. STAT. §§ 32:701–749, which generally requires the furnishing
of a certificate of title for the valid transfer of a registered vehicle, is unclear as some
decisions ignore it when strict compliance with the law’s terms would harm an
innocent party and the delay in obtaining a valid certificate of title was caused by
administrative failure. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 75, § 7:9.
120. Yorkwood S&L Ass’n v. Charlie Hardison & Sons, Inc., 383 So. 2d 1266,
1267 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (distinguishing Flatte on the ground that the original
owner—actually a mortgagee—“never entered into an act of sale with the
intermediary,” the person who absconded with the eventual transferee’s money
after a fraudulent sale of a motor home to a third party, and that the most that
could be said was that the original owner/mortgagee executed “a pick-up order”
for the motor home to be picked up by the intermediary).
121. Stroud, supra note 85, at 51–52 (observing that courts’ tendencies to
focus on the original owner’s negligence was common long before the revision of
the Civil Code’s bone fide purchaser articles took place).
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to whom possession is delivered acquires ownership provided he
is in good faith. Creditors of the transferor may seize the movable
while it is still in his possession.122
The first paragraph of Article 518 mirrors the publicity principle
announced in Article 517 with respect to immovables.123 The voluntary
transfer of a movable becomes effective between the parties at the moment
the contract setting the terms for that transfer is confected, unless the
contract provides that ownership will transfer at some other time or after
some condition is fulfilled. Delivery—transfer of possession—is not
required for ownership of the movable to transfer between the parties. Yet
just as recordation is required for the transfer of an immovable to be
effective against third parties, possession of a movable must be delivered
from the transferor to the transferee for the transfer of the movable to have
any effect on third parties.124
Good faith entered the framework of Article 518 in the 1984 revision
of the law of conventional obligations when the legislature added the
article’s second paragraph to replace Articles 1922 and 1923 of the 1870
Civil Code.125 Those articles, like their source articles in even earlier civil
codes, articulated the same rules, albeit in more antique and verbose
language.126 These source articles reveal that as far back as 1808, when a

122. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 518 (2018) (emphasis added).
123. See id. art. 517 (providing that, as between the parties, transfer of
ownership of an immovable is effective at the moment of the agreement but that
“[t]he transfer of ownership . . . is not effective against third persons until the
contract is filed for registry in the conveyance records of the parish in which the
immovable is located.”).
124. Art. 518.
125. Id. rev. cmt. f.
126. Article 1922 of the 1870 Civil Code, derived almost verbatim from
Article 1916 of the 1825 Civil Code, provided:
With respect to movable effects, although, by the rule referred to in the
two last preceding paragraphs, the consent to transfer vests the
ownership of the property in the obligee, yet this effect is strictly
confined to the parties until actual delivery of the object. If the vendor,
being in possession, should, by a second contract, transfer the ownership
of the property to another person, who gets the possession before the first
obligee, the last transferee is considered as the owner, provided the
contract be made on his part bona fide, and without notice of the former
contract.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1922 (1870). The same general principle appeared in the
Digest of 1808 in more concise terms:
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vendor tried to sell the same thing twice, the second transferee prevailed
over the first transferee and retained ownership as long as the first
transferee did not obtain possession and the second transferee was in good
faith at the moment his contract was formed.127 Perhaps because it
confirms such a well-established principle in Louisiana law,128 Article
518(2) rarely has been the subject of reported judicial decisions.129
Yet one decision is notable. In Cameron Equipment Co. v. Stewart &
Stevenson Services, Inc., the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal
applied Article 518 to the multiple sales of two valuable diesel engines by
the same vendor.130 In June 1987, the original owner, a company known as
Petroleum Services, sold two engines to another company called Cameron
Equipment.131 For reasons that are unclear, even though it paid $73,000 for
the engines and some other used oilfield equipment, Cameron Equipment
did not take physical possession of the two engines or mark them as its
property.132 Instead, the engines remained in storage at an equipment yard
managed by another entity.133 Two years later, a quick succession of
transactions resulted in the same engines being sold by Petroleum Services,
If the thing that one has engaged to give or to deliver to two persons, be
merely movable, he of the two persons who has really been put in
possession of it, is preferred and [remains] the owner of it, although his
title be posterior in date, provided the possession be bona fide.
LA. CIV. CODE p. 266, art. 41 (1808). The 1808 provision was itself a practically
verbatim transcription of Article 1141 of the Code Napoleon. [CODE CIVIL] [C.
CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1141 (Fr.) (1804).
127. See supra note 126.
128. The 1984 revision, which added the second paragraph to Article 518, also
clarifies that the second transferee is now protected even if she has not paid for
the movable. The new version of the rule unambiguously protects all subsequent
transferees who take possession in good faith, not just good faith purchasers for
value. Compare LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 518 (2018), as amended by Act. No.
331, § 2, 1984 La. Acts 718, with LA. CIV. CODE art. 1922 (1870).
129. The only reported decision turning on Article 518, other than Cameron
Equipment, discussed below, is LeGardeur Int’l, Inc. v. Ascension Const. Corp.,
504 So. 2d 587 (La. Ct. App. 1987). That decision, however, merely holds that a
lessee cannot, with respect to a lessor who has sequestered two pieces of
equipment in conjunction with a suit for unpaid rent, transfer ownership of the
movables to a third-party purchaser because the lessee does not have, and
therefore cannot deliver, possession of the movables to the third party. Id. at 588.
LeGardeur did not address the question of good faith.
130. Cameron Equip. Co. v. Stewart & Stevenson Servs., Inc., 685 So. 2d 696
(La. Ct. App. 1996).
131. Id. at 697.
132. Id. at 697–98.
133. Id. at 698.
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the original vendor, to a third purchaser, which then sold the engines to a
fourth purchaser, which in turn sold them to a fifth purchaser.134 At this
point, the commercial drama took a curious turn. Just one day after it
brokered the engines to the fifth—and last—purchaser, the fourth
purchaser actually picked up the engines from the yard where they had
been stored and delivered them to the last purchaser.135 Coincidentally, just
a few hours later, Cameron Equipment, the first purchaser, arrived at the
storage yard to pick up its engines, only to discover they were gone.136
Not surprisingly, Cameron Equipment sued everyone, including the
president and sole shareholder of the original vendor, Petroleum
Services.137 Although Cameron Equipment obtained a judgment against
Petroleum Services, the original vendor, for $50,000—the fair market
value of the engines at the time of the second sale—for conversion, the
trial court, relying on Article 518, dismissed all of Cameron Equipment’s
claims against the subsequent, third-party purchasers because it had not
taken actual or constructive possession of the engines and thus did not
perfect its ownership against the subsequent purchasers, all of whom the
trial court determined acted in good faith.138 The Louisiana Third Circuit
Court of Appeal affirmed, specifically rejecting Cameron Equipment’s
argument that Article 518 was inapplicable merely because the subsequent
purchasers each purchased from a vendor who was not in actual possession
of the engines at the time of the respective sales.139 Although the court of
appeal did not fully analyze the subsequent purchasers’ good faith, the
clear implication of its ruling is that a purchaser can be in good faith even
when his vendor does not have corporeal possession of the thing sold.
As a matter of general principle, the court’s ruling in Cameron
Equipment makes perfect sense. One can easily imagine scenarios in
which a vendor offers a movable for sale but the movable is not in the
vendor’s actual possession—for instance when a vendor has temporarily
transferred possession of the thing for sale to a depositary or bailee. In
Cameron Equipment, perhaps each successive purchaser reasonably
assumed that its vendor had left the two engines in the third-party
equipment yard under such an arrangement. Nevertheless, it remains
somewhat curious that this kind of bailment relationship was presumed to
exist three times in a row in quick succession. What if other facts existed
that might have put a reasonably prudent purchaser on notice to investigate
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 699–700.
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the provenance of the engines offered for sale? Unfortunately, the
appellate court opinion never addressed this concern, leaving today’s
reader with a vague sense of unease. Perhaps the purchasers in Cameron
Equipment were all honest, but they all may not have been sufficiently
careful in the curious circumstances of this transaction.
Maybe the best explanation for the result in Cameron Equipment
emerges if the inquiry about carefulness is widened to encompass the
original purchaser, Cameron Equipment, who certainly could have
avoided the entire mess if it had simply taken secure possession of the
valuable engines it had purchased—or at least marked them as its property
in some easily observable manner—as soon as it bought them. The court’s
decision to limit Cameron Equipment’s remedy to a breach of contract
claim against its own corporate vendor feels intuitively just because, after
all, its carelessness was the ultimate source of this commercial debacle.140
D. The Faithless Pledgee, Lessee, or Depositary
The last bona fide purchaser scenario—the faithless pledgee, lessee,
or depositary—reveals a gap in the Civil Code produced by the muchlamented repeal of Article 520 in 1981, just two years after the Louisiana
Legislature adopted the revised chapter on Transfer of Ownership by
Agreement.141 Many commentators argue that the repeal of this article has
left the bona fide purchaser doctrine in shambles because this single article
formed the foundation upon which the entire superstructure of the Civil
Code revision of the bona fide purchaser doctrine rested.142 The author of
this Article remains more sanguine than many of his Louisiana colleagues.
Repealed Article 520 provided that “[a] transferee in good faith for
fair value acquires the ownership of a corporeal movable, if the transferor,
though not the owner, has possession with the consent of the owner, as

140. Addressing Cameron Equipment’s claim to pierce the corporate veil and
hold the president and sole shareholder of Petroleum Services liable, the court of
appeal accurately observed that the plaintiff’s claim was better described as one
for “breach of warranty by the seller” and then noted that the plaintiff failed to
prove any of the elements of fraud necessary to justify piercing the corporate veil.
Id. at 701.
141. The Louisiana Legislature, in fact, first suspended the article in 1980, S.
Con. Res. 172, Reg. Sess. (La. 1980), and delivered the decisive blow the
following year. Act. No. 125, § 1, 1981 La. Acts 351.
142. Sinclair, supra note 111, at 518, 523; Stroud, supra note 85, at 60–63;
Tanya Ann Ibieta, Comment, The Transfer of Ownership of Movables, 47 LA. L.
REV. 841, 848–53 (1987).
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pledgee, lessee, or depositary, or other person of similar standing.”143 One
commentator suggests Article 520 was intended to codify a rule “similar
to but broader than the jurisprudential doctrine of equitable estoppel.”144
Another commentator explains that the article was intended to provide a
broad exception to the general rule of Article 518—“that only an owner or
someone authorized by him may transfer ownership in a movable”—
whenever there has been a transfer by a mere possessor, rather than the
original owner.145 A third commentator argues that this article, a
significant exception to the rule that one cannot convey ownership of
property that belongs to another, “represented an unequivocal policy shift
to protect the stability of seemingly valid transactions over the rights of
owners.”146 In their treatise on the law of sales, Professors Gruning and
Tooley-Knoblett describe Article 520 as the “key article in the chapter”
and suggest that it “picked up where Article 2279 of the French Code left
off, articulating the concept of possession as indicative of ownership of
movables, but with greater clarity.”147 Why then was such a wondrously
drafted and well-intentioned article repealed? Why has it not been
replaced?
The story that has been told time and again in Louisiana involves two
powerful commercial interest groups who did not like Article 520 and
convinced the Legislature to repeal the provision. First, the equipment
leasing industry worried that untrustworthy lessees would be able to
transfer ownership of valuable leased equipment to good faith purchasers
for value too easily and the equipment lessors would be left only with
claims against judgement-proof lessees.148 Second, chattel mortgage
143. LA. CIV. CODE art. 520 (repealed 1981).
144. Ibieta, supra note 142, at 849. Ibieta argues that pre-revision
jurisprudence tended to use two different rationales to avoid application of the
harsh rule of Article 2452 that the sale of a thing belonging to another is null. One
line of reasoning relied on the theory that a transfer from the original owner to an
intermediary often was only a relative nullity, the action to assert a relative nullity
could be asserted only by the original owner, and in the absence of such an action,
title had passed to the intermediary, thus bypassing application of Article 2452.
Id. at 844. The other rationale involved application of equitable estoppel
principles and a finding that an original owner had often clothed the intermediary
with sufficient indicia of ownership to induce the third party to rely on his
apparent authority to sell the movable under consideration, thus preventing the
original owner from revendicating the movable. Id. at 844–45.
145. Stroud, supra note 85, at 55–56.
146. Sinclair, supra note 111, at 523.
147. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 75, § 7.3, at 330.
148. Id.; Sinclair, supra note 111, at 526 (pointing to apprehension among
retailers and equipment leasing companies).
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holders who financed the sales of motor vehicles and other valuable
movables, along with equipment lenders, worried about the security of
their collateral.149 Critics of the repeal of Article 520 have argued that these
concerns were overblown. Lessors of unregistered movables could have
protected their interests by performing more careful credit examinations
of their lessees, by permanently marking their leased property, or by
acquiring security interests in the leased movables.150 Chattel mortgage
holders, at least those who had perfected their mortgages, were also not
really at risk because they enjoyed an enforceable preference against any
purported good faith purchaser.151
Although these critics no doubt correctly point out the legal remedies
equipment lessors and chattel mortgage holders held at their disposal, the
fears of the equipment lessors in particular cannot be dismissed as entirely
insignificant. It stands to reason that if equipment lessors had continued to
feel threatened by Article 520, they might have invested more time and
money examining their lessees’ creditworthiness or obtaining security
interests, which might well have raised the cost of leasing equipment and,
in turn, raised the cost of construction activities across the state. Of course,
these empirical assumptions are not easily testable.
In any event, given that the Louisiana Legislature repealed Article 520
and has yet to replace it, Louisiana courts must turn to existing caselaw
and general principles to resolve cases involving faithless pledgees,
lessees, or depositaries. Two decisions, 90 years apart, suggest how
Louisiana courts are likely to muddle their way through, relying, as they
must, on good faith.
William Frantz & Co. v. Fink presents a case of the faithless depositary
straight from central casting.152 The plaintiff, William Frantz & Co.
(“Frantz”), a firm that operated a large jewelry store in New Orleans, gave
a man named Moss, an artisan who made, repaired, and occasionally
traded in jewelry, possession of two pairs of diamond earrings on
consignment.153 Moss claimed he had some customers who might be
149. Quoting Professor Yiannopoulos, Stroud notes that some of the chief
proponents of repeal were firms that held chattel mortgages on automobiles and
other movable property who worried that their collateral “could be transferred by
the lessee to a purchase in good faith for fair value to the detriment of the lessorowner or holder of a chattel mortgage.” Stroud, supra note 85, at 55 (quoting
Memorandum from A.N. Yiannopoulos, to the Louisiana State Law Institute, at 6
(Meeting March 6–7, 1981)).
150. Id. at 60.
151. Id.
152. William Frantz & Co. v. Fink, 52 So. 131 (La. 1910) (on rehearing).
153. Id. at 137.
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interested in buying the earrings, so Frantz let Moss take them on the
condition that Moss return them or pay a price for them, a price low
enough that Moss presumably could make a profit for his sales efforts.154
Moss, however, transferred both pairs of earrings to other individuals who
did not know that the earrings actually belonged to Frantz and had only
been consigned to Moss.155
The first transferee, a pawnbroker named Fink, purchased one pair of
earrings from Moss for $300, a price considerably less than the one Frantz
actually had set.156 Moss transferred the other pair of earrings to another
pawnbroker named Koritzky by the way of pledge.157 The trouble began
when Fink, the initial transferee from Moss, gave Moss 171 loose diamonds
to set in a pin or broach.158 Moss worked Fink’s 171 diamonds into a pin,
but Moss pledged the pin and diamonds to yet another pawnbroker, Keil.159
When Fink returned to reclaim his diamonds, Moss revealed that he had
pledged the diamonds and the pin to Keil and then, with admirable chutzpah,
told Fink that he could have the second pair of earrings pledged at
Koritzky’s shop if Fink redeemed them and also redeemed the pin and
diamonds at Keil’s shop.160 At this point, Fink made a fateful decision.
Rather than call the police, Fink agreed to Moss’s scheme and redeemed the
second set of diamond earrings that had been previously pledged to
Koritzky, presumably after also paying to get his 171 diamonds back from
Kiel.161
After Frantz, the original owner, inquired about its diamond earrings,
Moss told a suspicious story about how two armed men had robbed him at
his shop.162 At this point, Moss was arrested and finally revealed the entire
story of the earrings.163 Frantz sued Moss and sued Fink for return of both
pairs of the diamond earrings.164 In defense, Fink sought to keep both pairs
of earrings, arguing that Frantz had sold them to Moss as common law “sale
and return” transactions by which Moss could convey good title to Fink.165

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id.
Id. Frantz had set the price at $502. Id.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 137.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 138.
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On rehearing, the Louisiana Supreme Court, through a typically
learned and Solomonic opinion authored by Justice Oliver Provosty, held
that estoppel barred Frantz from recovering the first set of earrings but not
the second.166 Provosty observed that Frantz’s initial actions—transferring
possession to Moss and also consenting that Moss, “a vender of jewelry[,]
exhibit the jewels as part of his stock of goods”—were sufficient to clothe
Moss, the consignee, with sufficient indicia of ownership to convey
title.167 Consequently, Frantz was thus estopped from denying Fink’s title
with respect to the first pair of earrings. In other words, at the time of the
first transfer of earrings from Moss to Fink, the court found there were no
facts that should have put Fink on notice that Moss was anything but their
owner, and, therefore, “Fink, knowing [Moss] to be a trader in jewels, was
justified in buying from him,” and “acquired a good title to the first pair
of earrings.”168
The court held, however, that Fink could not assert equitable estoppel
with respect to the second pair of earrings because by the time he acquired
these from Moss, Fink had plenty of reasons to doubt Moss’s purported
status as owner.169 Indeed Moss’s actions with respect to Fink’s 171 loose
diamonds should have opened his eyes to the likelihood that Moss was “a
confessed embezzler.”170 Accordingly, the court held that although Fink
could keep the first set of earrings, he must return the second set to
Frantz.171
William Franks and Co. v. Fink represents a rhapsody on the good
faith themes of honesty and carefulness. Justice Provosty essentially found
that Frantz bore some responsibility for its relative carelessness by
entrusting valuable diamond earrings to Moss, but he also concluded that
Fink’s own utter carelessness condemned him to lose ownership of the
second pair of earrings because by the time he gained possession of them,
he had no excuse in ignoring Moss’s dishonesty.
Interestingly, if a case involving similar facts were to arise today and
if, for the sake of argument, Article 520 remained part of the Civil Code,
the outcome might not have been all that different. To prevail under Article
520, Fink still would have to prove he was a “transferee in good faith for
fair value.”172 Assuming he paid fair value, Fink’s good faith would be
determined by asking, pursuant to Article 523, whether he knew or should
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 138–39.
Id. at 138.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 139.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 520 (repealed 1981).
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have known that Moss was not the owner of the earrings. One suspects the
change of circumstances between the first earring transaction and the
second likely would be sufficient to transform Moss from, in Justice
Provosty’s words, “a merchant or trader having valuable goods for sale”
into a “diamond setter who had pledged the goods of his employer and
stood under the necessity of confessing his crime because of his inability
to redeem the pledge.”173 In short, the change in circumstances would still
transform Fink from good faith purchaser to “willing victim.”174
In Louisiana Lift & Equipment Co. v. Eizel, a Louisiana court solved
another faithless intermediary case by relying on the general concept of
good faith.175 In that case, Eizel wanted to purchase a new forklift from
Louisiana Lift but lacked sufficient credit.176 To work around this problem,
Eizel and Louisiana Lift entered into a rent-to-own contract—technically, a
“Rental Purchase Transaction Agreement”—pursuant to which Eizel would
make 36 monthly payments and then become owner of the forklift.177
Despite a clause in the lease prohibiting the lessee-purchaser from selling
the forklift during the lease, and after making only 11 payments, Eizel sold
the forklift to a third party, Creamer Furniture/Creamer Brothers, Inc.
(“Creamer”).178
When Louisiana Lift sued to recover the forklift from Creamer, the
trial court ruled in favor of the original owner, Louisiana Lift, ordering
Creamer to return the forklift or pay Louisiana Lift its fair market value.179
The court of appeal, however, reversed, holding that the third party,
Creamer, was a good faith purchaser pursuant to Article 524 of the
Louisiana Civil Code—the article addressing the rights of good faith
acquirers of lost or stolen things—because at the time Creamer purchased
the forklift there was no evidence it belonged to Louisiana Lift.180
Consequently, Louisiana Lift could regain possession of the forklift only
if it paid Creamer its purchase price—$9,000.181 Distinguishing Brown &
Root,182 the court of appeal characterized Creamer as a good faith acquirer
for several reasons: (1) there were no decals or other markings on the
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
1985).

William Frantz & Co., 52 So. at 138.
Id. at 139.
La. Lift & Equip. Co. v. Eizel, 770 So. 2d 859, 859 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 861.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 862.
Id. at 865–66.
Id.
Brown and Root, Inc. v. Se. Equip. Co., 470 So. 2d 515, 515 (La. Ct. App.
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forklift indicating Louisiana Lift’s ownership; (2) no liens had been filed
with respect to the forklift, and Creamer claimed it had checked for liens;
(3) Eizel’s business appeared legitimate at the time he sold the forklifts to
Creamer; and (4) the mere fact that Eizel was liquidating his business did
not put Creamer on inquiry notice under Article 523.183
No doubt one can point to flaws in the court’s analysis in Louisiana
Lift. First, even assuming Article 524 was applicable despite the absence
of a real act of theft, the court failed to ask whether Eizel was a merchant
customarily selling similar goods so as to warrant Creamer’s claim to good
faith purchaser status. Further, as Judge Caraway pointed out in his
dissent, the mere fact that Article 520 had been repealed did not somehow
transform Eizel, the lessee, into a thief such that Article 524 properly
applied in this case.184 In addition, § 1-203 of Chapter 9 of Louisiana’s
version of the Uniform Commercial Code might have solved this case had
the court bothered to apply it.185 Finally, this case would have been more
neatly solved by Article 520 because then Creamer would surely have been
protected as a good faith purchaser for value from a lessee.186
On the other hand, at least the court in Louisiana Lift did not try to
resolve the case by relying on the principle of Article 2452 that “[t]he sale
of a thing belonging to another does not convey ownership.”187 Moreover,
the court also answered the fundamentally appropriate questions—
questions that would have been relevant under almost any framework.
After all, the court determined that the third-party purchaser, Creamer,
acted honestly and with a reasonable degree of carefulness when it

183. La. Lift, 770 So. 2d at 866.
184. Id. at 868 (Caraway, J., dissenting). It appears that Judge Caraway would
have resolved this dispute by holding that Louisiana Lift actually sold the forklift to
Eizel as a credit sale, and thus, Eizel could convey good title to Creamer. Louisiana
Lift’s proper remedy, which it failed to use, would have been to protect its interest in
the financed lease by filing a UCC financing statement in the forklift. Id. Thus, he
would have reached substantively more or less the same result but by different means.
185. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 75, § 4.21, at 184–86.
186. La. Lift, 770 So. 2d at 867–68 (Caraway, J., dissenting); Sinclair, supra
note 111, at 534–35.
187. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2452 (2018). Judge Caraway contended that one
valid alternative would have been to “revert back to Article 2452, which would
have provided full protection to the dispossessed owner.” Sinclair, supra note 111,
at 535. Such an approach, Sinclair contends, would “cast the law backward to a
long-outmoded rule,” precisely the opposite of what the legislature intended when
it undertook its revision of the bona fide purchaser doctrine in light of modern
jurisprudence that favors weighing the equities and determining which party was
the lease cost avoider. Sinclair, supra note 111, at 535.
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purchased the forklift.188 It also found that the lessor, Louisiana Lift, failed
to take some reasonable measures—marking its equipment and filing
liens, for example—that could have prevented any loss from occurring.189
In sum, in cases of faithless pledgees, lessees, and depositaries, even
in the absence of Article 520, courts appear to revert to their default good
faith analysis. Sometimes they use the common law language of estoppel
as their guidepost. Sometimes they borrow other tools in the bona fide
purchaser doctrine tool kit, even if those tools are not a perfect fit. But they
always inquire about the honesty and carefulness of the good faith
purchaser claimant and often widen their inquiry to investigate the
potential carelessness of the original owner who put its movable in the
hands of another person.
III. ACCESSION
The same legislative act that updated Louisiana’s bona fide purchaser
doctrine also revised the Louisiana Civil Code provisions addressing
accession.190 The law of accession generally serves to bracket disparate
resources together in one economic unit typically based on relationships
of physical proximity and practical connection between things.191
Frequently, accession rules produce intuitively comfortable and
economically efficient outcomes.192 For instance, although buildings,
other constructions permanently attached to the ground, standing timber,
and unharvested crops all can be owned separately from the land to which
they are physically connected, Louisiana law presumes that these things
form an integrated economic unit with the land unless clear evidence of
separate ownership exists.193 Landowners, the law of accession presumes,
will take care to manage these accessory things in efficient ways that

188. La. Lift, 770 So. 2d at 865–66.
189. Id. at 866.
190. Act. No. 180, § 1, 1979 La. Acts 431 (enacting both Chapters 2 and 3 of
Book II, Title II of the Civil Code, LA. CIV. CODE arts. 483–525).
191. Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J. LEG.
ANALYSIS 459, 461 (2009).
192. By assuring that most of the time the accessory thing is awarded to the
owner of the principal thing, the law of accession serves, as Merrill tells us, the
“internalization function we associate with the institution of property,” that is, by
assigning “[the] gains and losses associated with the management of resources”
to “the owner of the most prominently connected property,” accession tends to
“[assign] resources to those likely to be competent mangers of the resource.” Id.
193. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 491 (2018).
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maximize both their value and the value of the land to which they are
connected.194
Problems arise in the law of accession, however, when someone other
than the owner of the underlying immovable erects buildings or other
constructions, plants or harvests crops, cuts standing timber, or removes
minerals from the earth, and that person—the active party who produces
some value by his engagement with the accessory thing—does not
separately own the accessory thing. In other words, sometimes a new
accessory thing will appear as a result of the labor, work, or investment of
“possessors”—persons who intend to become owners of the land but lack
a title either to the immovable or to the new resources they are tasked with
bringing into the world.195
General principles of unjust enrichment, which tend to circulate just
beneath the surface of many specialized rules of accession, could resolve
many of these conflicts.196 But it would be difficult and time consuming to
perform a thorough unjust enrichment analysis of the competing rights of
the owner and possessor in all of these situations. Further, Louisiana law
has cast unjust enrichment as a subsidiary—that is, a not particularly
robust—remedy.197 For these reasons, and as shown in the following
discussion as well, Louisiana has embedded within its law of accession a
number of short-hand rules to make efficient, rough-cut allocations of the
194. Merrill, supra note 191, at 461.
195. In Louisiana, a true possessor, someone who intends to possess for
himself as owner, is distinguished from a precarious possessor, such as a lessee
or depositary, who possesses with the permission of or behalf of the owner.
Compare id. arts. 3421, 3424 (defining possession and elaborating on the
prerequisites to the acquisition of possession), with id. arts. 3437–38 (defining
precarious possession and a presumption of precariousness). For a detailed
discussion of the problem of distinguishing between true possession and
precarious possession, see Lovett, Precarious Possession, supra note 72.
196. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 488 cmt. b (stating recovery of
expenses by good faith extractors of products is “said to rest on principles of
unjust enrichment”); Id. art. 498 cmt. e (stating that when “a third person’s or
good faith possessors’ rights in constructions, plantings, or works that he may
have made on the land of another are lost in case of alienation of land, . . . the
third person is relegated to a personal action for reimbursement from the former
landowner”).
197. See id. art. 2298 (“The remedy declared here is subsidiary and shall not
be available if the law provides another remedy for the impoverishment or
declares a contrary rule.”). For a detailed account of the limitations or enrichment
without cause as a remedy and for an exploration of its general principles, see
generally Nicholas Davrados, Demystifying Enrichment Without Cause, 78 LA. L.
REV. 1223 (2018).
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remedial rights that possessors can assert with respect to new resources
they have created or produced on another person’s immovable.
Although three sets of accession rules relate to immovable property as
a general class, only one set employs good faith as a rule of decision. 198
The most general set of rules first declares that the owner of a thing
acquires ownership of the civil and natural fruits yielded by that thing. 199
The Civil Code then provides that when fruits are produced by the work
of another person, the owner can retain them only if he reimburses the
producer of the fruits for his production expenses.200 This default rule
establishes a limited form of restitution for a producer of fruits, regardless
of the producer’s status as a good or bad faith possessor or even as a
precarious possessor.
A second, more complicated set of rules addresses disputes between
owners and precarious possessors—persons who make constructions on or
plant things on the land of another with the owner’s consent—after the
initial consent has been removed.201 This second set of rules, generally
applicable to persons like servitude holders or others possessing though a
formal or informal license, also does not implicate good faith.202

198. Beyond the three sets of accession rules described in this Article, two
other sets of accession rules also exist in Louisiana law. One group of Civil Code
articles deals with accession rights along the banks of rivers, lakes, and the
seashore, but these articles do not implicate good faith. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts.
499–506. Good faith does, however, makes a brief appearance, at least in
contradistinction to its twin, bad faith, in the context of accession in relation to
movables, specifically when a person makes a new thing using materials
belonging to another. When the value of the workmanship exceeds the value of
the materials, the new thing belongs to the person who made the new thing, but
the maker must reimburse the owner of the materials for their value. Id. art. 511.
However, “[i]f the person who made the new thing was in bad faith, the court may
award its ownership to the owner of the materials.” Id. art. 512. For a more
detailed discussion of accession in relation to comingled movables, see Merrill,
supra note 191, at 486.
199. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 483 (“In the absence of rights of others, the
owner of a thing acquires the ownership of its natural and civil fruits.”). The
Louisiana version of the rule of increase is based on the same principle. Id. art.
484 (“The young of animals belong to the mother of them.”).
200. Id. art. 485 (“When fruits that belong to the owner of a thing by accession
are produced by the work of another person, or from seeds sown by him, the owner
may retain them on reimbursing such person his expenses.”).
201. See id. arts. 493, 495.
202. Lessees used to fall into this category; now, post-termination rights of
lessees and lessors to improvements and additions to the leased thing made by the
lessee during the lease are governed by Louisiana Civil Code article 2695.
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The third set of rules regulates disputes between owners and actual,
non-precarious possessors and makes a series of rough-cut allocations
based on whether the possessor was in good faith or bad faith.203 The Civil
Code allocates ownership of gathered fruits—whether natural or civil—to
a good faith possessor who gathered them before being evicted by the
owner and also rewards the good faith possessor with reimbursement of
expenses for fruits he was unable to gather before eviction.204 Conversely,
the bad faith possessor must return to the owner fruits he gathered before
eviction or their value, but he is entitled to reimbursement for his
expenses.205 With respect to products—things like minerals or standing
timber whose removal diminishes the substance or value of the land in the
intermediate to long term206—a good faith possessor can claim
reimbursement for expenses incurred in the removal or harvesting of such
items, but the bad faith possessor cannot.207
Further, when constructions, plantings, or works are made by a
possessor in good faith, the owner of the immovable, somewhat
surprisingly to law students at least, “may not demand their demolition and
removal”;208 instead, the owner must keep them and reimburse the
possessor, at the owner’s option, “either the cost of the materials and of
the workmanship, or their current value, or the enhanced value of the
immovable.”209 In contrast, when these same things are made by a bad
faith possessor, the owner of the immovable can choose whether to keep
them or demand their demolition and removal at the expense of the bad
faith possessor.210 Further, the owner can obtain compensation for any
other provable damage.211 Additionally, if the owner of the immovable
elects to keep these things, he does not have to pay the bad faith possessor
for inseparable improvements like a pond or a ditch, though he still must

203. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 486, 488, 496–97, 527–29.
204. Art. 486.
205. Id.
206. Article 488 defines products as things that are “derived from a thing as a
result of diminution of its substance.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 488; cf. id. art. 551
(“Fruits are things that are produced or derived from another thing without
diminution of its substance.”). See art. 551 rev. cmt. b (explaining treatment of
trees as products, not fruits, but noting that trees on a tree farm can be considered
fruits); art. 551 rev. cmt. c (explaining that mineral substances extracted from the
ground and proceeds of mineral rights are both treated as products).
207. Art. 488.
208. Art. 496.
209. Id.
210. Art. 497.
211. Id.
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pay the bad faith possessor, at the owner’s option, “either the current value
of the materials and of the workmanship of the separable improvements
[for example, a house or a barn] that he has kept or the enhanced value of
the immovable.”212
Finally, after an owner has prevailed on a petitory or revendicatory
action, an evicted possessor can still recover necessary expenses incurred
for the preservation of the thing and the discharge of public or private
burdens,213 but only a good faith possessor can recover additionally for
“useful expenses to the extent they have enhanced the value of the
thing.”214 In short, in this crucial third realm of accession, good faith
possessors, good faith harvesters, good faith product extractors, and good
faith improvers all are treated better than their bad faith counterparts.
In light of this repeated preferential treatment of good faith possessors,
then, the law of accession needs a handy, easily understood principle to
make these important good-versus-bad-faith distinctions workable. Article
487 of the revised Civil Code provides the rule:
For purposes of accession, a possessor is in good faith when he
possesses by virtue of an act translative of ownership and does not
know of any defects in his ownership. He ceases to be in good
faith when these defects are made known to him or an action is
instituted against him by the owner for the recovery of the thing.215
Derived with only minor variations from Article 503 of the 1870 Civil
Code216 and its earlier Louisiana and Code Napoleon predecessors,217
current Article 487 contains three distinctive features.
212. Id. (emphasis added).
213. Id. art. 527.
214. Id. art. 528. Interestingly, any possessor, “whether in good or in bad faith,
may retain possession of the thing until he is reimbursed for expenses and
improvements which he is entitled to claim.” Id. art. 529. Perhaps the deep
undercurrent of unjust enrichment in accession law explains why all possessors
are granted this practical leverage to obtain the restitution they are owed,
regardless of their degree of status in the possessory hierarchy.
215. Id. art. 487.
216. LA. CIV. CODE art. 503 (1870) (“He is [a] bona fide possessor who
possesses as owner by virtue of an act sufficient in terms to transfer property, the
defects of which he was ignorant of. He ceases to be a bona fide possessor from
the moment these defects are made known to him, or are declared to him by a suit
instituted for the recovery of the thing by the owner.”).
217. LA. CIV. CODE art. 495 (1825) (same except for punctuation and the word
“owner” read “proprietor); LA. CIV. CODE art. 7, p. 102 (1808) (more or less the
same); [CODE CIVIL] [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 550 (1804) (Fr.) (“He is in
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First, good faith for purposes of accession requires two components.
The possessor must possess by virtue of some act translative of ownership,
which, in the case of immovable property, must be either an authentic act
or act under private signature.218 Additionally, the possessor also must be
ignorant of any defects in the act.219 Thus, the possessor cannot simply
believe that he is the owner simply because he believes his predecessor in
title was also the owner, but he must also be unaware that the instrument
by which he thinks he acquired ownership is defective.220
Unlike the definitions used for purposes of acquisitive prescription or
the bona fide purchaser doctrine, however, Article 487’s definition does
not import a reasonable person standard.221 Consequently, as long as the
possessor possesses by virtue of a facially translative act, and as long as
the possessor remains unaware that the act is flawed in some manner or
originated from a person who was not actually the owner of all or part of
the thing purportedly transferred, a possessor still can be in good faith for
purposes of accession even if the possessor’s ignorance is objectively
unreasonable—even foolish—under the circumstances.222 The omission of
an objective reasonableness standard in Article 487 means that good faith
in the context of accession will focus primarily on honesty—and not
carefulness—particularly as reflected in the positive requirement of an act
possession by good faith who possesses, as proprietor, by virtue of a conveyance
of the defects of which he is not aware. He ceases to be in possession by good
faith from the moment wherein he discovers such defects.”) (Barrister of the Inner
Temple trans., 1824).
218. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1839 (2018).
219. Art. 487 rev. cmt. b.
220. Id. A good example of justifiable ignorance of a defect in an act
translative of ownership occurred in Clarke v. Brecheen, 387 So. 2d 1297 (La. Ct.
App. 1980), a case decided soon after the adoption of Article 488 in 1979 but in
which the court applied Article 503 of the 1870 Civil Code. In Clarke, the court
held that a purported donee under an act of donation in which the donor reserved
a usufruct was nevertheless a good faith possessor and thus entitled to
reimbursement for improvements he made to the property because he never had
reason to suspect any defect in the title to the donated property, the act itself was
valid in form, and he had “no idea that the reservation of the usufruct rendered the
donation an absolute nullity.” Clarke, 387 So. 2d at 1302–03.
221. Compare Art. 487, with id. art. 3480 (“For purposes of acquisitive
prescription, a possessor is in good faith when he reasonably believes, in light of
objective circumstances, that he is owner of the thing he possesses.”), and id. art.
523 (providing that an acquirer of a corporeal movable is in good faith “unless he
knows, or should have known, that the transferor was not the owner”).
222. Although not specifically stated in the Civil Code, good faith is also presumed
for purposes of accession, just as it is for acquisitive prescription. Art. 487 cmt. e.
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translative of ownership and the negative requirement of unawareness of
defects.223
Finally, in contrast to acquisitive prescription, a possessor’s good faith
for purposes of accession is temporally contingent; at the very instant that
the possessor acquires either actual knowledge—“when these defects are
made known to him”—or constructive knowledge of defects—“an action
is instituted against him by the owner for the recovery of the thing”—his
good faith ceases and the possessor instantaneously is transformed into a
bad faith possessor.224 Accordingly, the rather robust restitution-based
benefits that a possessor acquires under the law of accession if he
possesses in good faith can disappear immediately when the spell of honest
belief is broken, leaving the possessor with the much weaker remedies of
a bad faith possessor.225
This immediate temporal shift in accessorial remedies makes sense,
though, especially in the context of civil and natural fruits, which tend to
accumulate over time. A possessor who starts out in good faith but then
learns of defects in his title should not be able to benefit from natural and
civil fruits that accrue after he learns he is not the owner. Article 489,
which allows for apportionment of natural and civil fruits, logically builds
on this principle that good faith for purposes of accession is temporally
contingent.226
Louisiana judicial decisions addressing accession claims by possessors
generally demonstrate that the relatively straightforward, honesty-focused
223. In two decisions, however, courts have read objective reasonableness into
the good faith accession analysis despite the clear language of Article 487 to the
contrary. See Edmundson Bros. P’ship v. Montex Drilling Co., 731 So. 2d 1049,
1064 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (stating in the context of accession that “the presumption
[of good faith] may be rebutted on proof that the possessor knew or should have
known that he is not the owner of the thing he possessed”) (emphasis added);
Aertker v. Placid Holding Co., 2012 WL 4472002, at *4 (E.D. La. 2012) (“Taken
as a whole, these factors indicate to the Court that Placid was in bad faith because
it knew, or reasonably should have known, that Louisiana Pacific was not the
owner of the Aertker land, and, therefore, not authorized to grant the right-ofway.”) (emphasis added).
224. Compare art. 487, with art. 3482 (“It is sufficient that possession has
commenced in good faith; subsequent bad faith does not prevent the accrual of
prescription of ten years.”).
225. The bad faith accessorial possessor is someone who either lacks an act
translative of ownership or is aware of defects in her ownership but nevertheless
persists in her possession. She is not merely a temporary trespasser but someone
who continues to possess the immovable belonging to another with the intent to
become its owner. Id. art. 488 cmt. e (emphasis added).
226. Id. art. 489.
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rule articulated by Article 487 serves its functional purpose well. Courts
make quick and ready determinations about a possessor’s good faith and
sort with little difficulty the competing claims of the owner of an
immovable and a possessor with regard to civil or natural fruits and
reimbursement rights connected to improvements.
Consider a recent example, Lemoine v. Downs, in which a grandmother
claimed that she owned 30 acres of land that her husband had donated many
years earlier to her grandson.227 The grandmother claimed title because at
the time of the earlier donation her grandson was an unemancipated minor
and her husband had later attempted to revoke the donation and give the
property to her.228 The court eventually held that the grandmother was not
the owner of the property because the original donation was only relatively
null and thus could only be revoked by the grandson, who, of course, later
asserted his ownership of the property.229
When the grandmother eventually asserted accession claims against
her own grandson, the undisputed record owner of the property, the court
of appeal made quick work of her claims. It first held that the grandmother
was entitled to reimbursement for necessary expenses incurred to cut down
a tree and implicitly approved of her right to keep the initial rental income
derived from the property.230 But it also concluded that because the
grandmother became a bad faith possessor under Article 487 at the
moment that the grandson reconvened to assert his ownership rights, the
grandson was entitled to all of the civil fruits produced by the property from
the moment of the filing of the reconventional demand, subject to deduction
for certain other expenses incurred to preserve the property and a general
15% deduction from the rental income to reward the grandmother for her
efforts involved in renting the property.231 Importantly, the court sorted out
these reimbursement and civil fruit apportionment issues in short order,
without needing to assess the carefulness component of the grandmother’s
purported good faith.232
227. Lemoine v. Downs, 125 So. 3d 1115, 1117 (La. Ct. App. 2012).
228. Id.
229. Id. The grandson’s ownership of the underlying land and improvements
actually was resolved in prior litigation. Lemoine v. Downs, 58 So. 3d 659 (La.
Ct. App. 2011).
230. Lemoine, 125 So. 3d at 1118–19.
231. Id. at 1119.
232. Id. The court’s efficient, rough cut analysis of good faith for purposes of
accession contrasts sharply with its more nuanced examination of the
grandmother’s purported good faith in her ten-year acquisitive prescription claim
in prior litigation. Lemoine, 58 So. 3d at 662–63 (holding that the grandmother
could not be in good faith for purposes of prescription because she was a witness
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Other accession decisions display a similar allocative efficiency. In
one recent case, the court found that the operator of an oil and gas
production unit possessed certain land within the unit without the consent
of the landowner.233 As a result, the operator owed to the land owner the
proceeds of the oil and gas production attributable to those lands.234
Crucially, because the operator did not possess by virtue of an act
translative of ownership in its favor, the court also concluded that the
operator possessed in bad faith under Article 487 and therefore could not
claim reimbursement for any of the expenses of production under Article
488.235
In other cases involving mineral production, the crucial determination
of whether a produce who turns out to be a mere possessor and not a
rightful mineral lease or servitude holder can claim production expenses
again turns on the relatively mechanistic application of Article 487, even
though strictly speaking a mineral lease or servitude only creates real
rights and is not an act translative of ownership.236 In these cases, the
courts often hold that a producer/operator ceases to be in good faith under
Articles 487 and 488 at the moment an action is instituted against it,237 or
to her husband’s purported revocation, the revocation was unilateral, and the
donation itself was irrevocable and finding also that the purported revocation
could not constitute a just title because it was an act declarative—not translative—
of rights of ownership).
233. Caldwell Lands, Inc. v. Cedyco Corp., 980 So. 2d 827, 830 (La. Ct. App.
2008) (on rehearing).
234. Id. at 828.
235. Id. (reversing the previous decision finding an operator to be a good faith
possessor under Article 487 based on determination that record did not contain an
act translative of ownership in favor of operator).
236. Article 3483 of the Civil Code defines a “just title” for purposes of
acquisitive prescription as a juridical act “sufficient to transfer ownership or
another real right,” whereas Article 487 uses the more limited language of “an act
translative of ownership.” Compare LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3483 (2018), with
id. art. 487. In some of the cases discussed in this section, courts miss this
distinction between acts translative of ownership and acts establishing real rights.
In one case, for example, the court asks whether an operator owns or “does not
own a lease.” Caldwell, 980 So.2d at 829. In another, the court inquired into
whether the claimants knew of “the defects in their ownership of the lease.”
Edmundson Bros. P’ship v. Montex Drilling Co., 731 So. 2d 1049, 1064 (La. Ct.
App. 1999).
237. See, e.g., Lamson Petroleum Corp. v. Hallwood Petroleum, Inc., 823 So.
3d 431, 437 (La. Ct. App 2002) (holding that second oil company was not a good
faith possessor after first oil company filed its lawsuit regarding ownership
dispute over property and thus was not entitled to recover production expenses
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when some other event transpires, such as the transmission of a demand
letter or expiration of a lease, which clearly signals that a possessor no
longer has a legal right to remain on the underlying immovable property.238
Further, the mere misconception of a possessor that he might have a valid
claim to the property is clearly insufficient to establish good faith for
purposes of accession if the possessor lacks a title valid in form and relies
instead on pure parol evidence.239
Courts have also quickly dispatched accessorial reimbursement claims
asserted under the accession articles with the observation that claimants
who possess an immovable pursuant to a lease or sub-lease can never be a
good faith possessor because they do not possess by virtue of an act
translative of ownership; at most they are consensual, precarious
possessors whose accession-based remedies lie under other provisions of
the Civil Code dealing with these kinds of improvers,240 or specifically
with lessees.241 The logic and fairness of those articles, questioned by some
commentators, is beyond the scope of this Article.242
incurred after the filing of the suit), affirmed after remand, Lamson Petroleum
Corp. v. Hallwood Petroleum, Inc., 843 So. 2d 424, 426 (La. Ct. App. 2002);
Edmundson Bros., 731 So. 2d at 1064–65 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that
mineral lessees were bad faith possessors under Article 487 from the moment
mineral lessor filed suit to cancel lease for failure to develop property); Ruth v.
Buwe, 168 So. 2d 776, 779 (La. 1936) (holding that defendants were bad faith
possessors under Article 503 (1870) from the moment a petitory action was filed
against them).
238. Wood v. Axis Energy Corp., 899 So. 2d 138, 147 (La. Ct. App. 2005)
(holding that continued production under oil and gas lease was in bad faith as of
the date that the lessors made first written demand for release of the lease for
failure to produce in paying quantities and thus interest holder became responsible
for production expenses thereafter under Articles 487 and 488); Edmundson
Bros., 731 So. 2d at 1064–65 (holding that mineral lessees were bad faith
possessors after lease expired under Article 487 and they were not entitled to
Article 488 production expenses because they should have known that lease
would expire 90 days after production ceased).
239. Ruth, 168 So. 2d at 778.
240. See V&S Planting Co. v. Red River Waterway Comm’n, 472 So. 2d 331, 336
(La. Ct. App. 1985) (referring to LA. CIV. CODE arts. 493, 493.1, 493.2, and 495).
241. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2695 (providing detailed default rules for rights
and obligations of parties to a lease, upon its termination, with regard to
attachments, additions, or other improvements to the leased thing).
242. For criticism of the entire secondary accession rights regime in the Civil
Code, including especially Articles 493 and 495, see Symeon Symeonides,
Developments in the Law, Property, 47 LA. L. REV. 429, 451 (1986). For a defense
of those articles, see JOHN A. LOVETT ET AL., LOUISIANA PROPERTY LAW, THE
CIVIL CODE, CASES AND COMMENTARY 310–21 (2014).
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In summary, the quick and handy categorization tool represented by
Article 487’s definition of good faith greatly enhances the utility in solving
myriad resource allocation problems arising when a principal thing yields
an accessory thing through the work of someone other than the owner of
the principal thing or when some accessory object is placed on land
belonging to another. A good faith possessor must possess by virtue of
some act translative of ownership and must subjectively believe that she
actually was the owner of the principal thing she possessed. But by
keeping the good faith accession inquiry limited to these two relatively
simple factual determinations, generally eschewing complex and
contextualized evaluations of carefulness, and cutting off good faith at the
moment defects in title become readily known to the possessor, the revised
Civil Code generally has preserved the efficiency of Louisiana’s accession
regime, even as the demands placed upon it in an era of extensive mineral
and timber exploitation have increased.243
IV. ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION WITH RESPECT TO IMMOVABLES
In 1982, the Louisiana Legislature turned its attention to the last major
source of good faith in Louisiana property law examined in this Article—
ten-year acquisitive prescription with respect to immovables.244 As argued
elsewhere,245 the preservation of a two-tiered, French-inspired model for
acquisitive prescription of immovable property represents one of the most
important features of Louisiana’s property law system. Under that system,
a possessor with good faith and just title can acquire ownership or other real
rights in an immovable in just ten years,246 whereas a possessor without
either good faith or just title must possess continuously for 30 years to
acquire ownership or other real rights by acquisitive prescription.247
Although a detailed examination of how all the requisites of ten-year
acquisitive prescription function is beyond the scope of this Article, five
crucial characteristics mark prescriptive good faith in Louisiana law.
243. Louisiana’s timber piracy statute provides for heavy penalties to be
assessed against a person who unlawfully cuts or removes trees belonging to
another person but provides some relief for a good faith violator of the statute.
LA. REV. STAT. § 3:4278.1(C)–(E) (2018). For commentary, see Mirais M.
Holden, Timber Piracy, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Intent: The
Louisiana Supreme Court’s Decision in Sullivan v. Wallace, 21 SAN JOAQUIN AG.
L. REV. 103 (2012).
244. Act No. 187, § 1, 1982 La. Acts 518.
245. Lovett, Precarious Possession, supra note 72, at 624–45.
246. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 3473, 3475.
247. Id. art. 3486.
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First, good faith for purposes of ten-year acquisitive prescription is
distinct from and yet must be accompanied by just title.248 Second,
beginning decisively with the revision of the Civil Code in 1982 and the
adoption of revised Articles 3480 and 3481, Louisiana law requires not only
that a possessor asserting ten-year acquisitive prescription subjectively
believe he is the owner of the thing he is possessing; it also requires that this
belief be objectively reasonable under the circumstances.249 This means that
good faith for purposes of acquisitive prescription of an immovable has two
explicit components: a subjective and an objective one.250 As discussed
below, the focus on objective reasonableness is particularly important
because it requires courts to give much more attention to an acquisitive
prescription claimant’s carefulness at the time he commenced his possession
rather than make a simpler determination about the claimant’s subjective
honesty.
Third, under the Louisiana Civil Code, good faith is still presumed for
purposes of acquisitive prescription,251 although recent judicial decisions
have cast doubt on the viability of other presumptions related to possession
and prescription.252 Fourth, in tandem with the move toward an objective
248. As the revision comments note, “for purposes of prescription, good faith
and just title are separate ideas, whereas for purposes of accession, the two ideas
are blended.” Id. art. 3480 cmt. b. The same is true with respect to three-year
acquisitive prescription with respect to movables. Id. art. 3490. But as the revision
comments to Article 3490 note, the requirement of just title is easily satisfied
because for the transfer of movables there is no requirement that title be written
or recorded. Art. 3490 cmt. b.
249. Art. 3480 (“For purposes of acquisitive prescription, a possessor is in
good faith when he reasonably believes, in light of objective considerations, that
he is owner of the thing he possesses.”); id. art. 3481 (“Good faith is presumed . .
. . This presumption is rebutted on proof that the possessor knows, or should know,
that he is not the owner of the thing he possesses.”). This clarification must count
as one of the more significant improvements in the law of acquisitive prescription
accomplished by the Louisiana State Law Institute under the leadership of
Professor Yiannopoulos. The provisions of the 1870 Civil Code that were
replaced were didactic and vague. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3451–52 (1870).
250. Art. 3480 cmt. c (emphasizing that the revised article rejects previous
jurisprudence holding that good faith only required subjective belief of the
possessor that he owned the thing and importing objective reasonableness test into
good faith analysis).
251. Art. 3481. The first sentence of Article 3481 merely restates the same
numbered article of the 1870 Civil Code. Id. cmt. a.
252. See Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559 (La. 2015) (holding that
one neighbor who engages in acts of quasi-possession on a road or path crossing
his neighbor’s property is presumed to be possessing with the implied consent or
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conception of good faith, the 1982 revision clarified that neither error of
law nor error of fact defeats the presumption of good faith.253 Of course,
errors in judgment about the applicable law and misunderstandings of fact
might, in combination with other objective facts, provide a basis for a
record owner to rebut a prescription claimant’s presumed good faith.
Finally, unlike with accession, good faith for purposes of acquisitive
prescription, though measured immediately, remains temporally
boundless.254 If a prescription claimant has an objectively reasonable
belief that he is the owner at the commencement of his possession, the
Civil Code explicitly provides that “subsequent bad faith does not prevent
the accrual of prescription of ten years.”255 Consequently, good faith
status, once acquired by the prescription claimant, continues to benefit the
possessor even when the veil of subjective belief in his ownership has been
shattered by events or becomes objectively untenable.256
Several important themes have emerged from post-1982 revision
caselaw applying these principles. First, Louisiana courts have regularly
held that a ten-year acquisitive prescription claimant can prevail and prove
his good faith relying in part on the presumption of good faith stated in
Article 3482 even though he never conducted a title examination prior to
taking possession of the subject immovable.257 On the one hand, this
acquiescence of the neighbor, and thus, his quasi-possession is presumed to be
precarious), discussed at length in Lovett, Precarious Possession, supra note 72.
253. Art. 3481. The revision comments elaborate on this point, noting that
revised Article 3481 “overrules legislatively the doctrine of legal bad faith,” that
is, the notion that an error of law could defeat good faith. Art. 3481 cmt. c. For
detailed discussion of this change, see Symeonides, supra note 242.
254. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3482.
255. Id. As the revision comments note, this rule is widespread in civil law
systems. Id. cmt. b.
256. The major exception to this rule occurs in the context of tacking, in which
the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that a ten-year acquisitive prescription
claimant seeking to cumulate his possession with that of a predecessor by
particular title must prove that both he and his predecessor commenced their
respective possessions in good faith. Bartlett v. Calhoun, 412 So. 2d 587 (La.
1982), discussed in John A. Lovett, Tacking in a Mixed Jurisdiction, in ESSAYS
IN HONOUR OF GEORGE GRETTON 162–76 (Andrew Steven ed., 2017).
257. Cantrelle v. Gaude, 700 So. 2d 523, 528–29 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (holding
that prescription claimants were in good faith even though no title examination
was made either by claimants or their predecessor, the mother and mother-in-law
of the claimants, and predecessor acquired property by quitclaim deed); Mai v.
Floyd, 951 So. 2d 244, 247 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that claimant was in good
faith, explicitly noting that “the fact that no parties, prior to [subsequent
prospective purchaser], conducted a title examination, which would have revealed
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interpretation should not be surprising because one of the revision
comments to Article 3480 explicitly stated that “an acquirer of immovable
property is not charged with constructive knowledge of the public records,
nor is he bound to search the public records in order to ascertain
ownership.”258
On the other hand, the resilience of this position is somewhat surprising
given the ubiquity of title examination in contemporary conveyancing
practice, the frequency with which title insurance is obtained in connection
with the acquisition and financing of real estate transactions, and calls by
prominent commentators for a change in the law to make the presence of a
title examination, if not an outright requirement, at least a significant factor
weighing in favor of good faith.259 Perhaps one explanation for Louisiana
courts’ refusal to make title examination an explicit requirement for good
faith in the context of acquisitive prescription can be found in related areas
of the law. For instance, there is a jurisprudential rule that a buyer asserting
the warranty against eviction against a seller of immovable property is not
required to conduct a title examination either.260 Alternatively, the
leniency of Louisiana courts on this point may just reflect a practical
understanding that in many parts of the state real estate transactions still
regularly occur without the benefit of title examinations.
The second important theme does not concern the failure to conduct a
title examination but concerns the consequences of having performed one.
In the landmark case Phillips v. Parker, the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that the Louisiana public records doctrine has no bearing on the analysis
of whether a ten-year prescription claimant is in good faith.261 That holding
the 1986 tax sale, does not create bad faith,” but also noting that the claimant
testified that he and his transferor visited tax assessor’s office prior to claimant’s
purchase of property and “[were] told no taxes were due prior to his purchase”);
Ponder v. Jenkins, 468 So. 2d 1275, 1278 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (observing that “[a]
purchaser will not be charged with bad faith because a title examination, if made,
would have disclosed defects in the seller’s title” and holding claimant was thus
in good faith, despite lack of title examination, in the absence of any other
evidence challenging presumed good faith).
258. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3480 cmt. d.
259. Symeonides, supra note 242, at 439–41.
260. See Richmond v. Zapata Dev. Corp., 350 So. 2d 875, 978 (La. 1977)
(“Because the registry laws are only intended as notice to third parties and have
no application whatever between parties to a contract, a vendee is under no
obligation to search the record in order to ascertain what his vendor has sold and
what it has not, and the vendor is entitled, as between himself and his vendor, to
rely upon the deed as written.”).
261. Phillips v. Parker, 483 So. 2d 972, 976 (La. 1986) (“The law of registry is
not involved in any way with the theory of acquisitive prescription that a party who
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meant that the mere availability of relevant information in the public
records revealing a conflicting claim or interest does not, without other
available indicia of a potential title defect, destroy good faith.
Just as important, the court in Phillips also established that when an
acquirer of immovable property does conduct a title examination, that
action does not impart constructive knowledge of every fact ascertainable
in the public records so as to destroy the claimant’s good faith.262 As a
result, the prescription claimants in that case, the Parkers, prevailed on
their ten-year acquisitive prescription defense in a boundary action even
though they had conducted a title examination prior to the transaction by
which they acquired their property.263 As Justice Lemmon’s majority
opinion explained, a rule imparting constructive knowledge to claimants
like the Parkers, who had hired an attorney and reasonably relied on that
attorney’s analysis of a survey and a title abstract, would have been not
only grossly unfair to the Parkers264 but potentially disastrous for
Louisiana property law.265
reasonably believed he was acquiring valid title should be deemed to have a valid
title after a certain period of possession in which the owner failed to object.”).
262. Id. at 977–78. As the court noted, imputed knowledge is a completely
different matter. If the Parkers’ title examiner or attorney had discovered the
defect in their vendor’s title and had disclosed it to them, or even if they had
discovered the defect and failed to disclose it to them, they would be bound by
that information and their good faith would have evaporated. Id. at 978.
263. Id. at 978–79. In Phillips, the Parkers had built a fence that encroached
on their neighbor’s property in reliance on the property description found in their
deed, but, as it turned out, the Parkers’ property description was erroneously
drawn because the plaintiff, Phillips, actually owned the additional strip of land
that was mistakenly included in the Parkers’ deed. Id. at 973–74, 979.
264. Id. at 979. The mistake made by the Parker’s attorney in Phillips was,
indeed, easy to make. The Parkers’ advising attorney or the underlying title
examiner hired by the attorney either failed to find an August 1955 deed conveying
a lot from a common author to the Phillips’ predecessors in interest, the McCullers,
which had been recorded just a few months prior to the Parkers’ acquisition of their
lot in an exchange which itself cured a previous conveyancing error, or they failed
to compare the measurements in the McCullers’ property description with the
survey of the property that the Parkers’ intended to purchase. Id. at 974 n.2.
265. As every Louisiana property law student should learn, a contrary ruling
would have made ten-year acquisitive prescription unavailable for any claimant
who had conducted a title examination because all prior conflicting interests of a
record owner are, by definition, recorded. Id. at 977. Meanwhile, ten-year
acquisitive prescription would have remained within reach for possessors who
never bothered to conduct a title examination in the first place, thus “penalizing a
purchaser who employs a title examiner and rewarding one who doesn’t.” Id.
Remarkably, the intermediate appellate court in Phillips had reached precisely such
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By clarifying the impact of title examination in relation to good faith,
however, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Phillips avoided massive
confusion and demoralization costs and obviated the need for legislative
action to save the institution of ten-year acquisitive prescription from
unintended destruction. In short, the decision in Phillips protected
reasonably careful purchasers and acquirers of immovable property and
removed any incentive to act with intentional carelessness.
The third important theme of Louisiana courts interpreting the good
faith requirement for ten-year acquisitive prescription after the 1982
revision concerns the wide scope of relevant good faith inquiries and the
resulting wide variability of outcomes in reported decisions. In rejecting a
per se rule requiring title examinations but signaling that such an
examination and the knowledge gained from one can be “factors” in a
good faith analysis,266 the Supreme Court in Phillips made clear that the
1982 revision requires “a consideration of all of the factors of the
particular case relevant to the definition of good faith . . . .”267 Picking up
on this notion, Professor, and later Dean, Symeonides sought to give some
specificity to the factors that might be included in such a contingent, ad
hoc approach when he recommended that
[t]he possessor’s actual good or bad faith should be determined,
not by artificial fictions, but rather by evaluating, on a case by case
basis, all of the surrounding circumstances, including the
condition of the public records, the thoroughness of the particular
title search, the competence and reputation of the title examiner,
the type of title defect involved, the possibility of it being missed,
and other similar factors.268
In subsequent cases, Louisiana courts accepted the invitation jointly
extended by Phillips and Symeonides and have considered a wide spectrum
of personal, geographic, and transactional facts and circumstances in
making good faith determinations in the context of ten-year prescription
claims.
In some cases, courts use the tools of Articles 3480, 3481, and 3482
to reject claims of ten-year prescription claimants, usually focusing on the
objective unreasonableness of the claimant’s belief and on evidence of
a perverse result. Id. at 974–75 (explaining Phillips v. Parker, 469 So. 2d 1102 (La.
Ct. App. 1985)).
266. Id. at 977 n.7.
267. Id. at 977.
268. Symeonides, supra note 242, at 440–41. In his view, this ad hoc approach
was “essentially the supreme court’s approach in Phillips.” Id.
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subjective disbelief. In one instance, a court held that the third wife of a
deceased Louisiana man did not possess four Jefferson Parish lots that her
husband purportedly transferred to her in good faith because at the time of
those transfers she knew or should have known that her husband was, in
fact, still legally married to his Mississippi common law wife and thus did
not have the authority to transfer the property without her consent.269 In
another case, a court held that the possessors of a portion of a lot adjacent
to the Shreve Island Cut Off in Caddo Parish were not good faith
possessors because they had long harbored doubts about the extent of their
ownership of the land, and the majority of the land at issue was covered
by a lake produced by a dramatic avulsive event that took place on the Red
River in 1930.270
But in other cases, ten-year prescription claimants prevail, often with
an assist from the powerful presumption of good faith. In one case, a court
held that the succession of a family that had possessed some De Soto
Parish residential property for more than ten years had proved good faith
based on a voluminous body of evidence all tending to reinforce the
conclusion that the family members reasonably believed they owned the
property in question.271 That evidence included two deeds purporting to
transfer the property, photographs, utility payments, tax assessments,
homestead exemption records, home improvement contracts, and even a
deceased parent’s death certificate.272 Finally, in a recent decision, the
Louisiana Fifth Circuit affirmed a civil jury’s determination that the
second wife of a successful New Orleans businessman was in good faith
when her husband purported to transfer to her his deceased first wife’s
50% interest in the valuable home he had acquired as community property
with his first wife.273 There, the court found good faith despite testimony
indicating not only some possibility of subjective knowledge of her

269. In re Succession of Hendrix, 990 So. 2d 742, 749–50 (La. Ct. App. 2008).
Facts of particular relevance included the claimant’s false statements on the acts
of transfer that she was the transferor’s wife when, in fact, the couple was not yet
married; the claimant’s knowledge of the previous common law wife and a son
born of the common law marriage; and the claimant’s knowledge that the son had
written his father expressing an interest in meeting him. Id. at 750.
270. Hamel’s Farm, L.L.C. v. Muslow, 988 So. 2d 882, 894 (La. Ct. App.
2008). Avulsion generally refers to a sudden action of a river or stream that carries
away an identifiable piece of riparian land and attaches it to other riparian lands
on the same or opposite side of the river or stream. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 502
(2018); YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 91, § 4:15, at 172.
271. Heirs of Morris v. Simpson, 987 So. 2d 659, 669 (La. Ct. App. 2008).
272. Id.
273. Legardeur v. Coleman, 131 So. 3d 1305, 1042–44 (La. Ct. App. 2013).
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stepchildren’s interest in the former community property asset but also
some unusual family circumstances that might have caused a reasonable
acquirer to have doubts about her husband’s authority to make such a
transfer.274
Of course, in many other intriguing decisions Louisiana courts have
evaluated the factors relevant to good faith in the context of ten-year
acquisitive prescription and reached generally defensible conclusions.275
A similar kind of analysis takes place when courts examine claims of

274. In Legardeur, the jury apparently credited the wife’s testimony that (1)
she always believed her husband wanted her to have the house; (2) her husband
had transferred the house to her as a gift; and (3) no one informed her of the 50%
interest of her husband’s children from his previous marriage. Id. at 1043. The
jury apparently discounted the stepchildren’s testimony about a family meeting at
the subject home at which they allegedly informed the second wife of their 50%
interest in the home prior to their father’s transfer. Id. The court of appeal refused
to overturn the jury’s credibility determination under a manifest error standard of
review. Id. at 1044. After her husband’s death, the second wife eventually sold
the house for $1,150,000, and as a result of her successful ten-year acquisitive
prescription defense, she kept all of the proceeds. Id. at 1039.
275. See, e.g., City of Shreveport v. Noel Estate, Inc., 941 So. 2d 66, 80–81 (La.
Ct. App. 2006) (finding claimant was in good faith in light of opponent’s failure to
introduce any evidence to demonstrate knowledge of defects in 1972 deed other
than vague and unsupported allegations that consideration paid was inadequate;
non-warranty deed to possessor was insufficient to preclude good faith); Cockerham
v. Cockerham, 16 So. 3d 1264, 1268 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (finding claimant to be in
bad faith because the 1963 cash deed to predecessor upon which claimant relied did
not reflect how transferor acquired the interests of multiple co-owners he purported
to convey, there was no other evidence suggesting transferor had anything to
convey, and transferee, having received a 3/24 interest ten years earlier, should have
known transferor did not own the property he was attempting to convey); Lallande
v. Verret, 21 So. 3d 444, 446–47 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (affirming trial court finding
that claimant who acquired property via sheriff’s sale was in good faith; information
supplied by foreclosing bank included plat listing triangular portion of lot as part of
lot being sold); Lemoine v. Downs, 58 So. 3d 659, 662–63 (La. Ct. App. 2011)
(holding husband’s attempt to revoke unilaterally the donation of immovable
property to his minor son was an insufficient basis for wife’s assertion of good faith;
the fact that the wife witnessed attempted revocation only revealed she was aware
of original donation, which was only a relative nullity and only subject to challenge
by son); EOG Res., Inc. v. Hopkins, 131 So. 3d 72, 84 (La. Ct. App. 2013)
(affirming trial court finding that claimant commenced possession in good faith
based on warranty deeds but also affirming trial court finding that claimant did show
exclusive possession for ten years in light of discredited testimony regarding fence).
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three-year acquisitive prescription with respect to valuable movables.276
What remains universally distinctive about all of these decisions, however,
is the relatively microscopic level of analysis and the focus on objective
reasonableness in light of all relevant circumstances. When the stakes are
high, as they are in claims of ten-year acquisitive prescription with respect
to immovables,277 the courts engage in relatively rigorous scrutiny,
carefully searching for evidence of actual honesty and reasonable
carefulness in the circumstances, even though possessors presumptively
possess in good faith.
CONCLUSION: PROPERTY LAW WITHOUT GOOD FAITH
To fully appreciate the importance of good faith in Louisiana property
law, it is useful to consider what Louisiana property law would look like
if good faith were banished from all of the areas just examined. In general,
property law might gain something in terms of certainty and predictability,
but those gains would likely be outweighed by other social costs,
particularly as property disputes would produce increasingly binary
outcomes and parties likely would over-invest in risk-reduction measures
to guard against unhappy results. In addition, the role of lawyers in
property law could well diminish while other professionals and even
computer programs might become more important.278

276. See Succession of Wagner, 993 So. 2d 709, 722–23 (La. Ct. App. 2008)
(affirming trial court finding that son failed to prove good faith in claim of threeyear acquisitive prescription with respect to $450,000 worth of gold coins based
on detailed analysis of son’s knowledge that coins were purchased with check
drawn on community checking account and his attempt to conceal his father’s
donation of coins to him without mother’s consent); Succession of Moore, 737
So. 2d 749, 754–55 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that nephew was a bad faith
possessor of family heirlooms because nephew took heirlooms after his aunt,
suffering from senility, was placed in nursing home and therefore nephew could
acquire ownership only by ten-year acquisitive prescription for movables).
277. Of course, in some boundary disputes the amount of immovable property
claimed by ten-year acquisitive prescription may be relatively small, but because
ownership shifts without any requirement of compensation, the stakes of these
cases are still high, at least as compared to encroaching building and accession
cases. In some boundary disputes, though, the amount of immovable property in
dispute can be quite large. See Loutre Land & Timber Co. v. Roberts, 63 So. 3d
120 (La. 2011) (applying boundary tacking to resolve dispute over 15 acre tract).
278. As Hanoch Dagan has reminded the Author, this development should be
irrelevant to the objective legal reformer or theorist, but certainly lawyers and at
least some law professors would regret it.
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Consider the subject of encroaching building servitudes. It is hard to
imagine how this relatively new legal institution would survive in the
absence of a good faith requirement. If the institution fell, property owners
who mistakenly constructed buildings on their neighbors’ property or
acquired such buildings would probably be faced with the choice of either
tearing down the encroaching part of the buildings, paying exorbitantly to
acquire small strips of land, or trying to prove 30-year acquisitive
prescription if the encroachments were old enough.279 Perhaps surveyors,
aided by GPS technology, would benefit prospectively as property owners
learned to take greater care when starting construction projects, but the
role of lawyers in sorting out these problems would diminish over time.
It is also hard to see how the bona fide purchaser doctrine would
continue to function as currently designed without good faith as the crucial
rule of decision in these kinds of disputes. If good faith was suppressed as
the key analytical factor, Louisiana would need some other rule or standard
to help courts decide whether to protect the security of title of an original
owner of a corporeal movable or protect the interests of an eventual
transferee. In the absence of such a rule or standard, the legal system would
have to choose one of the two positions to favor in disputes of this nature.
And indeed, if Louisiana chose to protect only one of these positions with a
clear rule, that choice would likely increase social costs—more wasteful
investment in security measures for original owners or much more
investment in examining the provenance of vendors’ claims of ownership
for third-party purchasers of movables. Insurance costs on both sides of the
equation might well rise in response. By adopting a good faith analysis that
favors the eventual transferee, especially when that transferee acquires the
movable in a relatively normal market transaction, Louisiana has, in effect,
created a rule-like standard that smooths market transactions yet leaves open
the possibility for a true owner to protect his security of title when unusual
circumstances should have made the transferee suspicious.
If Louisiana did not distinguish between good and bad faith possessors
in accession, the accession regime likely would rely on either over/underinclusive unjust enrichment remedies, if such remedies could even be
asserted. If the law did not allow the relatively quick and ready goodversus-bad-faith determinations in this area, Louisiana most likely would
revert to the least common denominator and treat all possessors in the
279. Ten-year acquisitive prescription would be out of the question in most of
these cases because claimants would lack a just title describing the encroached
upon ground. Thirty-year prescription claims would likely be bogged down in
difficult disputes over whether the initial encroachment was precarious or adverse.
If possession was adverse, boundary tacking under Louisiana Civil Code article
794 would be the crucial ground of dispute.
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same manner as current bad faith possessors. Hence, possessors of land
would be limited to claims for production expenses in connection with
production of fruits,280 barred from any restitutionary remedy in cases of
extraction of products,281 and relegated to claims for reimbursement in
connection with major improvements only when owners elected to keep
inseparable improvements that added value to the underlying immovable
while exposing them to liability if the owner did not want an improvement
to remain on the immovable.282 Moreover, in this monochromatic
accession regime, accession disputes essentially would turn into
accounting challenges and would involve little or no legal judgment.
Lawyers would hand over the reins to accountants and appraisers.
Finally, and most dramatically of all, if Louisiana eliminated the
consideration of good faith from acquisitive prescription, it would face a
difficult choice. If it wanted to preserve a shorter acquisitive prescription
period for purposes of clearing title in cases involving innocent
conveyancing mistakes, it likely would have to establish a number of other
specific criteria for a claimant to satisfy. Those criteria might be objective,
but they could lead to over/under-inclusive results. Alternatively, if
Louisiana chose to settle on just one time period for all claims of
acquisitive prescription, Louisiana would have to select between a tenyear—or perhaps an even shorter—prescriptive period, the long 30-year
period currently used for possessors in bad faith or without just title, or
perhaps split the difference and set the prescriptive period at some
middling duration. If a short period was employed, Louisiana might
reward bad faith possessors too easily and too quickly, thus eliminating
incentives for parties engaged in real estate transactions to take reasonable
precautions and act carefully.283
On the other hand, if a lengthy period was chosen, innocent
conveyancing mistakes would be much more difficult to repair. Title
examination would become even more important but also would become
more costly and time-consuming because the consequences of a mistake
280. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 486 (2018).
281. Id. art. 488.
282. Id. art. 497.
283. Two prominent property law scholars have made a similar point, arguing
that from a property law design perspective, affording good faith possessors
ownership after a shorter period and bad faith possessors ownership after a longer
period makes sense in terms of efficiency and reduction of demoralization costs.
Richard Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of
Property, 64 WASH. U. L. Q. 667, 684–89 (1986); Robert C. Ellickson, Possession
and Perpetuities: Two Dents in the Libertarian Model of Property Rights, 64
WASH. U. L. Q. 723, 725–34 (1986).

2018]

GOOD FAITH IN LOUISIANA PROPERTY LAW

1221

would be much higher. Assuming a longer time period was employed,
acquisitive prescription could still fix ancient mistakes and could continue
to align very long-term possessory facts on the ground with record title but
only if recent developments with regard to precarious possession in this area
does not otherwise erode the transformative power of acquisitive
prescription more generally.284 Again, the role of the property litigator in
this area would shrink while the role of the title examiner and title abstractor
would grow in importance. This course is not without precedent in mixed
jurisdictions,285 but it would be a significant departure for Louisiana law.
This concluding sketch is admittedly speculative. Although property
law without good faith might become more predictable and more certain
in some respects, perhaps other unimaginable uncertainties—those
problematic “unknown unknowns”—would soon appear.286 As the
preceding discussion makes clear, this author prefers a property law
system in which good faith plays an important role—at least in the four
areas discussed above. The meandering and oscillating currents of good
faith in the revised Civil Code give Louisiana’s property law system
several great advantages—a penchant for flexible, contextualized decision
making; a responsiveness to ethical norms; and a strong regard for the
interests of others—all qualities that tend to lend stability to the system in
the long run.

284. Lovett, Precarious Possession, supra note 72.
285. In Scotland, by contrast, positive—that is, acquisitive—prescription of real
rights in immovable property is possible after a period of continuous possession—10
years to acquire ownership and 20 years to acquire a servitude—if the possession is
based on an ostensible registered title, but good faith is not required. Prescription and
Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, §§ 1–3, discussed in GEORGE L. GRETTON &
ANDREW J.M. STEVEN, PROPERTY TRUSTS AND SUCCESSION ¶ 6.14 (3d ed. 2017).
286. See News Transcript of News Briefing with Secretary of Defense Donald
H. Rumsfeld, DEPT. OF DEFENSE, http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript
.aspx?TranscriptID=2636 (last visited Apr. 4, 2018) (quoting Secretary Rumsfeld
as saying, “Reports that say that something hasn’t happened are always interesting
to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we
know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are
some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we
don’t know we don’t know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country
and other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones.”)
[https://perma.cc/U49S-FKAF].

